A human rights analysis of posthumous reproduction in South Africa. by Shozi, Bonginkosi.
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF KWAZULU-NATAL COLLEGE 
OF LAW AND MANAGEMENT STUDIES 
SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
 
A Human Rights Analysis of Posthumous Reproduction in 
South Africa 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree 
of Master of Laws (LLM) in Constitutional Law, Theory and Human Rights 
Litigation at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Law 
 
By Bonginkosi Shozi 
214511633 
Supervisor: Dr DW Thaldar 
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
I, Bonginkosi Shozi, hereby declare that except where specified otherwise this 
project is an original piece of work by me which is made available for 
photocopying and for inter-library loan. 
 
Signed:________________________________________________________                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal and the College of Law and Management Studies 
for affording me the opportunity to do my LLM.  
I would also like to acknowledge the South African Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union, whose financial contributions toward my studies allowed me to 
undertake postgraduate studies. 
This dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance of Dr 
Donrich Thaldar, and so I wish to thank him for his support, patience and 
consistently challenging me to do better.  
I would also like to thank my friends and family for their support during the 
course of writing this dissertation – especially my mother who consistently 
endeavoured to be helpful in any way she could, and who had faith in me even 
when she feared for my sanity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Advances in the field of medicine are consistently posing difficult questions to 
the law and society. This is because of the propensity of these medical 
advances to alter the limits of what is and is not possible, and when this 
happens we are forced to decide on how these new medical technologies will 
be used. It has been said that no use of medical technology poses more 
challenging questions than posthumous reproduction. This is because in the 
past, the act of reproduction was limited to living persons. However, now 
persons can become parents long after they die. This study was prompted by a 
case that recently came before the High Court, in which a widow sought to use 
her dead husband’s sperm in order to have a child. The court granted her 
order, but did not give reasons – thus leaving the rationale behind the decision 
unknown. This case came before the court because, in the relevant laws, what 
happens to gametes and embryos after the death of the gamete provider is 
largely unaddressed. 
This study looks at the law relating to posthumous reproduction in 30 foreign 
jurisdictions. This investigation reveals that there is no consensus on 
regulating posthumous reproduction, and state positions range from highly 
permissive regulation based on voluntary guidelines, to highly restrictive 
positions enforced by statutes.  
In analysing how South African law regards posthumous reproduction, the 
study finds there are no legal barriers to posthumous reproduction in South 
Africa, and that human rights related to procreative liberty support posthumous 
reproduction. The study concludes there is a right to posthumous reproduction, 
based on the freedom of testation in relation to reproductive material – which 
our law conceives as property – and reproductive autonomy. However, there 
are significant gaps in the law in South Africa that ought to be addressed by 
legislative reform in order to accommodate the exercising of this right.  
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Background 
Much of life revolves around reproduction; the desire to reproduce has made 
the existence of children one of the most common parts of human life. Ever 
since the first child was conceived via artificial means, lawyers, lawmakers and 
humanity as a whole have had to grapple with the issue of how to deal with 
artificial means of reproduction.1 As such, our minds and our statute books 
have adapted to provide for procedures now made available by advances in 
medical technology, such as artificial insemination and surrogacy, but this 
adaptation has been slow, and the law always seems a step behind medical 
technology. 2  This dissertation will discuss a relatively recent advance in 
medically assisted reproduction (MAR) that has been gaining popularity 
internationally and is once again challenging our traditional paradigms and is 
requiring us to answer many new questions posed by technologies that alter 
the barriers of what is possible: posthumous reproduction. This refers to the 
use of the reproductive material of a deceased person for procreative 
purposes.3  
Posthumous reproduction (PR) as a concept goes back as far as 1954 when it 
was first described by Bunge, who showed that it was theoretically possible to 
freeze and thaw human spermatozoa for later use.4 It was not until Bunge’s 
theory became a reality in the 1980s, with the first reports of the successful 
creation of pregnancies resulting from cryopreserved reproductive material (i.e. 
                                                      
 
1 The first documented application of artificial insemination in a human was done in London in 
the 1770s by John Hunter. See, W Ombelet, J Van Robays ‘Artificial Insemination History: 
Hurdles and Milestones’ (2015) 7(2) Facts Views Vis Obgyn 137-143. 
2 Even though there is evidence of MAR being practiced as early as the 1700s, the first law on 
MAR only came into existence in 1984 with the Infertility Act of the Australian state of Victoria. 
See, U Ahluwalia, M Arora ‘Posthumous Reproduction and its Legal Perspective’ (2011) 2(1) 
Am.Int'LJ. Infertiility & Fetal Med 9. 
3 R Collins ‘Posthumous Reproduction and the Presumption Against Consent in Cases of 
Death Caused by Sudden Trauma’ (2005) 30 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 431. 
4 A Nienaber ‘The Grave’s a Fine and Private Place’ (2010) 25 Southern African Public Law 2. 
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gametes and embryos), that the possibility of PR truly became a reality.5 This 
is because it is now possible to freeze gametes or embryos such that they can 
be used for reproduction at any point while they are still viable. Which creates 
the possibility of reproduction occurring after one parent is deceased.  
The concept of a parent dying before their child is born is not unheard of. But 
posthumous reproduction is to be differentiated from instances where a parent 
unexpectedly dies after a child is conceived through coital reproduction, in that 
it involves using medical technology to utilise a person’s reproductive material 
for reproduction after that person is already dead.  
 
1.2 Forms of Posthumous Reproduction 
The term ‘posthumous reproduction’ as used in this dissertation is an umbrella 
phrase that encapsulates three different methods by which a deceased person 
can have their reproductive material used for reproductive purposes after their 
death. The first method is posthumous conception (PC) – where gametes 
removed and stored before a person’s death are used to conceive a child after 
he or she dies.6 The second method, similar to the first, is posthumous 
embryo implantation (PEI). Here male and female gametes are combined to 
create the embryo while both parents are still alive and the embryos are stored; 
then they are implanted in a woman’s womb after the death of one parent.7 
The third method is posthumous gamete retrieval (PGR), where the gametes 
of deceased persons are removed from their bodies after they die and these 
are stored and later used to conceive a child.8 In the past, PGR was limited to 
                                                      
 
5 For information on the first reported pregnancies through the assistance of cryopreservation, 
see, generally, A Trounson, L Mohr ‘Human Pregnancy Following Cryopreservation, Thawing 
and Transfer of an Eight-Cell Embryo’ (1983) 305 Nature 707-709. 
6 D Teitelbaum ‘Be Fruitful and Multiply After Death, But at Whose Expense? Survivor 
Benefits for the Posthumously Conceived Children of Fallen Soldiers’ (2016) 14(425) Cardozo 
Public Law, Policy & Ethics Journal 427. 
7 G Bahadur ‘Death and Conception’ (2002) 17 Human Reproduction 2769. 
8 H Kruuse ‘From the Grave to the Cradle: The Possibility of Post-Mortem Gamete Retrieval 
and Reproduction in South Africa?’ (2012) South African Journal on Human Rights 532. 
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sperm – but now the removal of a female ovum is technically possible.9 Each 
of these methods is unique in its own right and they have different medical, 
ethical and potentially legal implications, but they also raise common issues 
that any discussion of posthumous reproduction must take into consideration. 
This dissertation will focus on these common issues.  
The topic of PR is controversial, stemming from the various interests that must 
be taken into account, which were described by Collins as follows: 
“[PR’s] controversial status derives from the plethora of conflicting interests which 
need to be factored into the ethical calculus including: the wishes and right to 
bodily integrity of the deceased, the procreative liberty of the surviving partner, 
the welfare of the potential child, the interests other members of the family have 
in emotional and financial relationships with the deceased, and, finally, the state’s 
interest in both protecting the basic unit of society, namely the family and 
maintaining stable land titles and the orderly distribution of property in the 
succession context.”10 
This passage serves to illustrate that there are five stakeholders whose 
interests are of significance in PR: the deceased, the surviving partner, the 
potential children (or, to make the term more specific, ‘posthumous children’), 
the deceased’s family, and the state. Posthumous reproduction poses a wide 
range of ethical and legal issues that could not be discussed comprehensively 
within the confines of this work. As such, this study will focus primarily on a 
single stakeholder: the individual from whom reproductive material is drawn 
and who is deceased at the time of conception. In this study, I will analyse the 
legal entitlement of individuals in determining the destiny of their reproductive 
material after they die, and whether there is a constitutionally protected right to 
posthumous reproduction in South Africa. 
 
 
                                                      
 
9 N Peart ‘Life beyond Death: Regulating Posthumous Reproduction in New Zealand’ (2015) 
46 Victoria University Wellington Law Review 7272. 
10 Collins op cit note 3 at 432. 
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1.3 Posthumous Reproduction Internationally 
Internationally, various jurisdictions have taken different approaches in 
determining if this practice should be permitted or not. Where it is permitted, 
varying approaches have been undertaken to deal with the complex issues 
associated with PR. Some states have elected to prohibit posthumous 
reproduction altogether,11 others have opted to allow it under a strict regulative 
scheme, 12 while still others have taken a less strict approach and have 
permitted the practice and also issued voluntary guidelines.13  
Studies have been conducted to provide a broad overview of the varying 
approaches taken in the area of posthumous reproduction, but these studies 
have largely focused on the European position. In 2008, the European Society 
of Human Reproduction and Embryology published a report (‘ESHRE report’) 
on the status of medically assisted reproduction in the European Union (EU), 
which dealt in part with posthumous reproduction 14  The ESHRE report 
identified 12 EU member states15 that prohibited the use of gametes and 
embryos for the purposes of posthumous reproduction, 15 EU member states16 
that allow the practice – and among this latter group 6 EU member states17 that 
prescribe legal restrictions.  
                                                      
 
11  See, for example, Germany in KD Katz ‘Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for 
Retrieving and Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying’ (2006) 1(11) University of Chicago 
Legal Forum 304. 
12 See, for example, the United Kingdom in Katz ibid 304. 
13  See, for example, India in V Bardle, PG Dixit ‘Birth After Death: Questions About 
Posthumous Sperm Retrieval’ (2006) 3(4) Indian Journal of Medical Ethics 122-123. 
14 ESHRE Comparative Analysis of Medically Assisted Reproduction in the EU: Regulation 
and Technologies (2008) 19. 
15 These states include Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Lativia, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden. 
16 These states include Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
17 These states are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. 
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Another study among new EU nations (‘New EU study’) and which focused on 
posthumous gamete retrieval was published in 2005.18 The New EU Study 
found that PGR is allowed by legislation or guidelines only in Estonia, is 
prohibited in 2 EU member states,19 and is not mentioned in 7 EU member 
states. 20 Despite discussing some of the same states, these two sources 
contradict one another in some cases. This may be because both studies 
based their information on answers to questions sent by the authors to 
designated persons – rather than analyses of law.21  
A 2007 report conducted by the journal Fertility and Sterility on PGR in 57 
nations, purports to deal with the South African position (FS Report). 22 
According to the FS Report, South Africa is among 11 countries23 that allow 
posthumous gamete retrieval and written consent by the deceased is 
required. 24  The report also states that the practice is prohibited in 19 
countries.25 Like the ESHRE report and the New EU study, the FS report 
relied on responses to questionnaires. For this reason, the basis upon which 
the designated person stated South African law allowed posthumous gamete 
retrieval is unclear, and there is no authority cited to support this statement.  
 
                                                      
 
18 J Dostal, R Utrata, S Loyka, J Brezinova, M Svobodova, F Shenfield ‘Post-Mortem Sperm 
Retrieval In New European Union Countries: Case Report’ (2005) 20(8) Human Reproduction 
2359-2361. 
19 These states are Hungary and Slovenia. 
20  These states are Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland and 
Slovakia. 
21 ESHRE Report op cit note 14 at 2, New EU Study op cit note 18 at 2360. 
22 I Cooke ‘Posthumous Insemination’ (2007) 87 (4) Fertility and Sterility 27. This work forms 
part of a chapter of the IFFS Surveillance 07 published by Fertility and Sterility.  
23 The other states are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Greece, India, Israel, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
24 Cooke op cit note 22 at 26. 
25 These states are Argentina, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Morocco, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, and Tunisia. 
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The challenge with these studies is that they are based on responses by 
medical practitioners, and there is no way to be certain about their accuracy in 
law. It is possible that medical practitioners may be misinformed as to what the 
applicable law on PR is. Furthermore, these authorities are over a decade old 
and therefore may no longer be relevant. There is thus a need for an 
investigation into the accuracy of these claims, based on current legal 
authorities in order to ascertain the true state of PR around the world. 
 
1.4 Posthumous Reproduction in South Africa 
Until recently, nowhere in our law had it been specifically addressed that PR is 
legally permitted. This however changed with the recent case of NC v Drs 
Aevitas Inc t/a Aevitas Fertility Clinic,26 where the High Court granted an order 
permitting the posthumous use of a deceased man’s sperm by his wife for 
reproductive purposes. Pursuant to this order, PR is, in principle, legal in South 
Africa – at least in the case posthumous conception. That said, many 
questions remain unanswered, which are material because of the potential 
impact on the living, children, and the dead.  
The literature on posthumous reproduction in South Africa is scarce and 
primarily focused on posthumous gamete retrieval. In specific reference to 
PGR, Helen Kruuse argues in favour of legislation to regulate it, with certain 
legal restrictions being implemented – including a “quarantine period” that 
requires a surviving spouse to wait a particular period before he or she can use 
gametes extracted from the deceased spouse.27 Kruuse notably objects to 
foreign legal systems that allow posthumous gamete retrieval and also insist 
on some form of consent from the deceased before death, on the basis that 
the dead have no rights – thus their consent is unnecessary.28 Kruuse states 
that the existing legal framework in South Africa, including the National Health 
                                                      
 
26 (23236/2017) [2018] ZAWCHC. 
27 Kruuse op cit note 8 at 551. 
28 Ibid 534. 
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Act,29 neglects to address the issue of posthumous gamete retrieval. She 
regards the specific reference to “living persons” in the Regulations Relating to 
Artificial Fertilisation of Persons30 as not dealing with extracting gametes from 
deceased persons, as opposed to outlawing it.31 This is questionable, as 
regulation 2 provides that, “these regulations only apply to the withdrawal of 
gametes from and for use in living persons”, and regulation 10 stipulates that no 
gamete “that has not been imported, removed or withdrawn in terms of the 
provisions of the [National Health Act] or these regulations … may be used for 
artificial fertilisation”.  
Another South African author, Annelize Nienaber, considers posthumous 
gamete retrieval.32 She comments that a variety of legal issues arise when 
considering posthumous gamete retrieval in South Africa – including individual 
autonomy regarding reproductive choice arising from section 12 of the 
Constitution, which provides that “Everyone has the right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right … to make decisions 
concerning reproduction.”  
In engaging with whether a deceased person may be the bearer of a human 
right, such as reproductive autonomy, Nienaber argues that what we are 
dealing with is not whether the deceased has a choice about whether to 
procreate – but rather if we choose to honour their choices regarding 
procreation that were made while they were still alive.33 Nienaber remarks: 
“[S]ection 12(2)(b) does not necessarily literally bestow a deceased person 
with a right to autonomy … it merely respects his right to autonomy or 
self-determination to decide whether to have a child while still alive”.34 Her 
                                                      
 
29 National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
30 Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons (Government Gazette 35099 
GN R175 2 March 2012). 
31 Kruuse op cit note 8 at 535. 
32 Nienaber op cit note 4 at 1. 
33 Ibid 7. 
34 Ibid. 
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conclusion seems to be that a deceased person cannot be a holder of rights 
and therefore the question in posthumous reproduction is not whether the 
deceased has a right to it – but whether we should respect the wishes of the 
deceased. Nienaber does not engage with why we ought to give effect to the 
wishes of the deceased.  
Nienaber opines that whether or not to honour the wishes of the deceased is 
not the only potential ethical or legal problem raised by posthumous sperm 
retrieval for procreation, and consideration must be given to other issues and 
challenges. These include the best interests and welfare of the child resulting 
from such sperm retrieval, the right to bodily integrity of the deceased, and the 
interests of other members of the deceased’s family.35 Nienaber’s statement 
that deceased persons can be holders of a right to bodily integrity, seems to 
contradict her conclusion that deceased persons cannot be holders of a right 
to reproductive autonomy.  
Nienaber raises the potential claim by a person requesting the retrieval of a 
partner’s sperm for procreation, that any statutory prohibition against such 
removal is a violation of their right of access to reproductive health care 
services in terms of section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, Nienaber 
also expresses doubt that the right to reproductive health care services could 
be stretched to entitle one to reproduce using the gametes of a deceased 
spouse or partner.36 Nienaber’s article raises some important issues on the 
potential implications of human rights for posthumous reproduction. However, 
this is a preliminary investigation, and, accordingly, does not advance beyond 
raising them as challenges to be addressed. As such, deeper analysis is 
required. 
Against the backdrop of the court order in Aevitas, while this study will 
endeavour to canvas the broad array of issues in this controversial area, this 
investigation into the legal status of posthumous reproduction in South Africa 
will focus primarily on instances of PR – where partners intended to have 
                                                      
 
35 Ibid 2. 
36 Ibid 6. 
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children together. The significance of this study is that it will an in-depth 
analysis of a relatively new area of law in South Africa and will be the first of its 
kind. This work will explore different approaches taken by foreign jurisdictions 
and will ultimately suggest which direction would be best suited for the South 
African context, as it relates to whether individuals ought to be permitted to 
engage in posthumous reproduction. The study will also engage with key 
constitutional issues related to making the decision to reproduce posthumously, 
including the right to reproductive freedom in section 12 of the Constitution, 
and the right to access medical care. In so doing, this study aims to broaden 
the current limited discussion of this topic in the South African context, and will 
encourage further debate.  
 
1.5  Research Objectives and Methodology 
The purpose of this research is to respond to the main question: from a human 
rights perspective, what should be the legal position regarding posthumous 
reproduction in South Africa? The methodology is a policy analysis. The study 
will be an applied comparison of the law in multiple jurisdictions and the merits 
of these approaches will be critically assessed to determine their potential 
application in the South African context. This information will be sourced from 
the electronic and print literature. 
In responding to the main research question, the following sub-questions must 
be addressed:  
• How have the various types of posthumous reproduction been dealt with in 
other legal systems? 
• What are the human rights applicable to posthumous reproduction? 
• Are the various types of posthumous reproduction legal in South Africa? 
• Are there any reasons, based on possible legitimate government purposes, 
for posthumous reproduction to be subject to limitation? 
• All considered, how should posthumous reproduction be regulated in 
South Africa, and is there a need for legal reform? 
10 
 
The study will be structured as follows: the first chapter was an introduction to 
the dissertation and presented a brief history on posthumous reproduction, 
introduced key terms, and highlighted the focus of the dissertation. 
The second chapter will be an analysis of the law regarding posthumous 
reproduction in foreign jurisdictions. The position in 30 states, where primary or 
secondary sources of data are available, will be presented in the form of a 
table. The data in the table will be discussed and trends will be highlighted. 
This chapter will expand on this data by providing a deeper discussion on the 
legal position in five states of significant interest in the area of posthumous 
reproduction: The United States of America, The United Kingdom, France, 
Israel, and Spain.  
The third chapter will focus on reproductive rights in the South African 
Constitution and their application to MAR. In doing so, this chapter will analyse 
how reproductive choices are protected in MAR and how these rights apply to 
non-coital reproduction by looking at applicable case law.  
Chapter four will discuss the various legal and ethical issues raised by 
posthumous reproduction, as well as the various approaches that can be taken 
in addressing these issues. In light of these issues, the legality of posthumous 
reproduction in the South African context will be considered.  
Chapter five will discuss possible limitations to posthumous reproduction – 
particularly relating to the interests of children. This chapter will assess the 
possible impact of PR on the rights and interests of other stakeholders, 
primarily resultant children, and whether there is sufficient reason for the state 
to outlaw or limit posthumous reproduction when the deceased has expressed 
a willingness to allow their reproductive material to be used after he or she 
dies.  
Chapter six will be the conclusion. It shall restate the core findings of this 
dissertation and will outline considerations to be taken if policy reform in this 
area is contemplated. With these considerations in mind, recommendations 
will be made regarding the regulation of PR in South Africa. 
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2. CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF LAW ON POSTHUMOUS 
REPRODUCTION IN MULTIPLE JURISDICTIONS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide clarity on an otherwise unclear area 
of law: What is the state of PR around the world? This information is valuable 
to any state seeking to break new ground in confronting PR and how the law 
should deal with it. An analysis of how other states have interpreted and 
balanced the various rights and interests of stakeholders is beneficial, as it 
allows us to learn lessons from other jurisdictions where there is a richer 
jurisprudence on these issues than in South Africa.  
The practice of benefiting from comparative analysis, in South African 
constitutional law, is well established. The Constitution provides for the 
influence of foreign law on our courts37 and the Constitutional Court has often 
looked to foreign sources in resolving difficult disputes on novel areas of law.38 
The benefit of comparative analysis is self-evident: it allows one to look at 
various approaches that have been taken, what their impact has been, and 
then ask what would be the best way forward in the particular circumstances.  
This chapter will be divided into two parts. The first part will focus on giving a 
broad overview of the state of the law on PR in countries that have law dealing 
with this area of MAR. The second part will then seek to move beyond a 
superficial glance at the world’s law and engage in a deeper analysis of the law 
on PR in five countries that are prominent in the literature: The United States, 
the United Kingdom, France, Israel, and Spain.  
 
                                                      
 
37 Section 39(1) of the Constitution states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, 
tribunal or forum-   
…. 
(c) may consider foreign law”.  
38 See, for example, Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 
(1) 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (CC) para 107; S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) 
para 33. 
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PART I 
2.1 Jurisdictional Study of Posthumous Reproduction Regulation 
The information in this part represents the results of desktop research on the 
state of the law on PR in 30 different states, that to some degree deals with PR. 
These countries were chosen based on their inclusion in works discussing 
state law on PR, such as the ESHRE Report, the New EU Study and the FS 
Report,39 as well as other studies that deal with MAR generally that touched 
on PR.40 
Based on the claims made on the legal positions stated in these works, 
research was conducted via online search for authority that corroborated these 
statements. The goal was to identify primary sources such as state law, court 
judgments or published guidelines. However, there were barriers to achieving 
this such as access to databases being restricted and language barriers. As 
such, where primary sources were unavailable, reliance was placed on reliable 
secondary sources, particularly journal articles from reputable sources – which 
were recent and made direct reference to primary sources. Once all this 
information was accumulated, I selected the 30 states which best fitted the 
parameters of the study – namely that there was some reliable authority for the 
existence of law, court judgments or guidelines (binding or not) that related to 
at least one of the types of PR. The results are presented in a table as Figure 
1. 
The table is divided into 3 sections – one each for PC, PEI and PGR. Each of 
the sections states whether the practice is permitted or prohibited in that 
country. While for most states there was some form of authority in the form of 
statutes, in some states there were only guidelines and these states are 
                                                      
 
39 See, also, AK Sikary, OP Murty, RV Bardale ‘Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in Context of 
Developing Countries of Indian Subcontinent’ (2016) 9(2) J Hum Reprod Sci 82-85; E 
Aziza-Shuster ‘A child at all costs: Posthumous reproduction and the meaning of parenthood’ 
(1994) 9 Human Reproduction 2182-2185.  
40 FP Busardò, M Gulino, S Napoletano, S Zaami, P Frati ‘The Evolution of Legislation in the 
Field of Medically Assisted Reproduction and Embryo Stem Cell Research in European Union 
Members’ (2014) BioMed Research International 1-15; A Minieri ‘Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies: A State Matter’ (2013) Vilniaus Univ. Press 214-223. 
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indicated with an asterisk. In these cases, the positions in terms of the 
guidelines were reflected in Figure 1. It is necessary to note that since 
guidelines are voluntary, the actual practice in these states may differ. Where 
there was no information to draw a conclusion on what the legal position is, 
this was indicated by “N/A”. The table further reflects if there are any conditions 
applicable where PR is permitted. The conditions indicated are whether the 
deceased is required to have given consent while still alive, if that consent 
needed to be in writing, and if there are any applicable use restrictions 
post-death (“p/d”) of the gamete provider – either in the form of waiting periods 
or time limits. The results of the findings on what the global trends are in 
regulating PR law, are discussed below.  
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Figure 1: Table of the Regulation of Posthumous Reproduction Law in 30 
Jurisdictions Identified as Having Some Degree of Related Regulation
STATE PC PEI PGR 
*Australia41 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Permitted. Written consent required Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Austria42 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
Belgium43 Permitted Permitted. Written consent required; 
only after 6 months p/d and before 2 
years p/d 
N/A 
Canada44 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Permitted. Written consent required Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Croatia45 Prohibited Permitted Prohibited 
Cyprus46 N/A Permitted. Written consent required; 
only after 6 months p/d and before 
18 months p/d 
N/A 
Denmark47 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
Egypt48 Prohibited Prohibited N/A 
Estonia49 Permitted. Only before 1 month 
p/d 
N/A N/A 
Finland50 Permitted. Consent required Permitted. Consent required.  N/A 
France51 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
Germany52 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
Greece53 Permitted. Only after 6 months 
p/d and before 2 years p/d 
N/A N/A 
Hungary54 Prohibited Permitted Prohibited 
*India55 Permitted Prohibited N/A 
*Israel56 Permitted Permitted  Permitted 
Italy57 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
*Japan58 Permitted Permitted  Permitted 
Latvia59 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
N/A N/A 
Macedonia60 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
N/A N/A 
Malta61 N/A Permitted N/A 
Netherlands62 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Permitted. Written consent required N/A 
New Zealand63 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Permitted. Written consent required Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Portugal64 Prohibited Permitted Prohibited 
Slovenia65 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
Spain66 Permitted. Written consent 
required. Only before 1 year p/d 
Permitted Permitted. Written consent 
required 
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Sweden67 Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
United Arab 
Emirates68  
Prohibited Prohibited Prohibited 
United Kingdom69 Permitted. Written consent 
required 
Permitted. Written consent required Permitted. Written consent 
required 
*United States70 Permitted  Permitted Permitted 
                                                      
 
41 Australian Government, National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines 
on the Use of Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (2017). 
42 Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetz Reproduction Law (2004). 
43 Law on Medically Assisted Procreation and The Destination of Surplus Embryos and 
Gametes (Loi Relative `A La Procreationm´Edicalement Assist´Ee Et `A La Destination Des 
Embryons Surnum´Eraires Et Des Gametes) (2007). 
44 Assisted Human Reproduction Act S.C. 2004, c.2, and the regulations in terms of this Act: 
The Assisted Human Reproduction Regulations (2007) and the All Families Are Equal Act 
(Parentage and Related Registrations Statute Law Amendment) (2016). 
45 Law on Medical Assisted Reproduction OG 86/2012. 
46 The Implementation of The Medically Supported Reproduction Law of 2015. 
47 Act on Artificial Fertilization in Medical Treatment, Diagnosis and Research, etc. LBK No. 
923 of 04/09/2006. 
48 Professional Ethics Regulations of the Egyptian Medical Syndicate, issued by Decree No. 
238/2003 of the Ministry of Health and Population (Ministry of Health Decree 238/2003). 
49 Artificial Insemination and Embryo Protection Act (1997), as amended in 2011. 
50 Act on Assisted Fertility Treatments (1237/2006). 
51 Law on the Donation and Use of Elements and Products of the Human Body, Medically 
Assisted Procreation, and Prenatal Diagnosis, No. 94-654 (LOI no 94-654 du 29 juillet 1994 
relative au don et à l'utilisation des éléments et produits du corps humain, à l'assistance 
médicale à la procréation et au diagnostic prénatal) (29 July 1994)). 
52 Embryo Protection Act of 13 December 1990. 
53 Law number 3305/2005. 
54 Law No. 154, 1997, 30/1998. (VI.24.) NM Regulation, Act on Health, Chapter IX, 20/2007.  
55 See proposed voluntary guidelines: Indian Council of Medical Research and National 
Academy of Medical Sciences. National guidelines for accreditation, supervision and 
regulation of ART clinics (draft). New Delhi: ICMR/NAMS; 2002. 
56 Ministry of Justice Guidelines of the Attorney General of the Government, guideline number 
1.2202, 27 October 2003. 
57 Rules on Medically Assisted Procreation 40 of 2004. 
58 M Mayeda ‘Present State of Reproductive Medicine In Japan – Ethical Issues With a Focus 
on Those Seen In Court Cases’ (2006) 7(3) BMC Medical Ethics 7. 
59 Sexual and Reproductive Health Law of 2004. 
60 Law of Biomedical Assisted Fertilization (2008). 
61 Embryo Protection Act XXI of 2012. 
62 Embryo Act (20.06.2002). 
63 Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004. 
64 Law 32/2006. 
65  Act on Infertility Treatment and Procedures of Biomedical Assisted Procreation 
(28.07.2000). 
66 Law 14/2006 of 26th May, on Human Assisted Reproduction Technologies. 
67 See Aziza-Shuster note 39 supra at 2185. 
68 Federal Law No. 11 of 2008 Concerning Licencing Fertility Centres in the State (Fertility 
Centres Law). 
69 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
70 Uniform Parentage Act 2000, Uniform Probate Code of 2008. 
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2.2 Trends in Posthumous Reproduction Law 
Of the 30 countries researched, the vast majority have chosen to create 
legislation to regulate MAR practices to some degree. Only India, Israel, Japan 
and certain states of Australia and the United States have systems where PR 
is regulated by guidelines or other non-binding instruments at a national level. 
Overall, there is no discernible trend for or against PR. Just over half of the 
states (16 of 30) have laws either completely prohibiting or completely 
permitting PR practices. Significantly more states have chosen to completely 
outlaw PR than those who have permitted: Austria, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden, Slovenia and the United Arab Emirates all have 
complete prohibitions on PR. On the other hand, only Australia, Canada, Israel, 
Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States are 
completely permissive in respect of all forms PR.  
The remainder of states either only prohibit or permit certain practices of PR, 
and the relationship between each of these practices reveals a difference in 
attitudes on the treatment of gametes, embryos and dead bodies, within these 
states. While there appears to be consistency in approaches in the case of PC 
and PGR, with every state that prohibits PGR also prohibiting PC, there is less 
consistency in the relationship between state positions on PC and PEI. Not all 
states that prohibit PC also prohibit PEI – with Croatia, Hungary and Portugal 
permitting it. The inverse is also true, although to a lesser extent, of the states 
that permit PC – India is the only one of these states that prohibits PEI. 
More states have laws in favour of PC than those that are against it, with 16 
states permitting PC71 and 1272 prohibiting the practice. Of the states that 
permit PC, 10 require some form of consent by the deceased to have their 
gametes used after they die73 – with Australia, Canada, Latvia, Macedonia, 
                                                      
 
71  Australia, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Finland, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, Latvia, 
Macedonia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Spain. 
72 Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates. 
73 Australia, Canada, Croatia, Finland, Latvia, Macedonia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Spain, and the United Kingdom. 
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Spain and the UK specifying that this consent must be in writing. Only Greece 
and Spain prescribe time conditions on PC. 
With PEI, as with PC, 16 states are in favour of the practice,74 while 10 
prohibit it.75 Of those that permit PEI, most require the deceased to have 
consented to the use of an embryo he or she contributed a gamete to while 
alive to be used after he or she dies.76 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom require this consent to be 
in writing. Belgium and Cyprus both impose time limits on the use of embryos 
posthumously.  
No state imposes time restrictions on PGR. Of the 6 states that impose some 
manner of time restriction, only Spain and Estonia opt for the use of strict time 
limits – and in both cases this for 1 year. The remainder of states enforce a 
‘window period’ for the use of gametes and embryos, in terms of which the 
surviving partner must wait a short period before he can choose to undergo PR, 
and once this time has passed he has a limited time period within which to do 
so.  
PGR is the only type of PR for which more states are against than in favour. 
Eleven states prohibit it,77 while only 8 permit it.78 The prior consent of the 
person from whom the gametes are to be removed is required for PGR in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United 
States – with only the United States not requiring the said consent to be in 
writing. Notably, PGR has been given the least amount of attention by the 
                                                      
 
74 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Malta, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States.   
75 Austria, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Italy, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United 
Arab Emirates.  
76 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
and the United Kingdom.  
77 Austria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, 
and the United Arab Emirates. 
78 Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.   
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states researched. Even among these states who were chosen on the basis of 
their dealing with PR to some degree, 11 states do not address PGR at all.  
While certain practices have received widespread acceptance, such as PR 
and PEI, PGR is clearly a highly polarising topic. Even where states all agree 
on a practice as being permissible there is still a fair amount of deviation on the 
issue of under what circumstances it may be allowed and the type of measure 
which ought to be used to control the practice. In order to gain further 
understanding of why and how laws on key issues relating to PR vary from 
state to state, Part II will outline the legal history, key case law, and current 
legal position in certain states. 
 
PART II 
2.3 Posthumous Reproduction in the United States of America 
MAR law regulation occurs at three levels in the United States of America: at 
state level in the form of non-binding uniform laws, at federal level in the form 
of state-specific laws, and at the professional self-regulations level in the form 
of guidelines and policies followed by medical practitioners.79 The US has a 
permissive approach to PR, and there are no laws in place in any state that 
prohibit it. 80 However, the level and nature of how it is regulated varies 
significantly from state to state since each state has the discretion on whether 
or not to adopt uniform laws and may create their own law or leave the 
regulation of MAR practices up to professional associations of practitioners or 
health care institutions.81 
Arguably the US has had the most opportunity to engage with the issues 
surrounding PR, considering it is the source of many of the key medical 
                                                      
 
79 Minieri op cit note 40 at 220. 
80 Teitelbaum op cit note 6 at 431 
81 There are two professional associations that oversee MAR in the US – The American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology. See, 
Minieri op cit note 40 at 200. 
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advances in this area. For instance, the US was the site of the first ever case 
of successful conception from PGR in 1995.82 However, yet very few states 
have comprehensive statutes in place to address PR and the legal status of 
resultant children,83 which has led to persons who have disputes relating to 
PR having to turn to the courts in order to get clarity. This is what happened in 
Hecht v Superior Court of California84 which led to the state of California 
becoming the first legal forum to deal with PR and children resulting 
therefrom.85 
In Hecht the deceased had been a divorcee with two children resulting from his 
marriage who, after his divorce, cohabited with one Deborah Hecht for a period 
of five years before committing suicide.86 Prior to taking his own life, the 
deceased had his sperm stored, intending for it to be used by Hecht to have 
children. This was expressed in a testamentary donation bequeathing his 
sperm to her and in a letter he wrote to his children intimating his hopes that 
Hecht would have his child after his death. However, when she sought to use 
the stored sperm, the deceased’s children objected and sought to have the 
sperm destroyed.87  
The application by the children to have the sperm destroyed was initially 
successful in the trial court, but the California Court of Appeal ultimately 
reversed the order.88 The court’s finding was that it was not contrary to public 
policy to allow PR in this manner – basing its decision on Hecht’s fundamental 
right to procreative liberty overriding any possible psychological harm to 
                                                      
 
82 JM Hurwitz, FR Batzer ‘Posthumous Sperm Procurement: Demand and Concerns’ (2004) 
59(12) Soundings 806. 
83 KS Knaplund ‘Children of Assisted Reproduction’ (2012) 45 University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform 900. 
84 Hecht v Superior Court of Los Angeles, 59 Cal Rptr 2d 222 (Cal Ct App 1996). 
85 BM Starr ‘A Matter of Life and Death: Posthumous Conception’ (2004) 64 Louisiana Law 
Review 631. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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existing children, which was what their application had been based on.89 The 
court noted that since the deceased had expressed a desire to have children, 
there was no state interest justifying interfering with his decision to donate his 
sperm to Hecht. Hecht’s victory was not absolute however, as the court found 
that resultant children in these circumstances could not inherit from the 
deceased’s estate – an issue which has been central to the law on PR in 
America.90 
Rather than regulating PR itself and when it would be appropriate to grant 
requests for it, the law in the US has largely focused on the issue of the legal 
status of posthumous children and whether they are entitled to benefits from 
the deceased’s estate or the state, on the basis of being recognised as the 
legal offspring of the deceased. This is reflected in the first state effort in the 
US in terms of addressing PR, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted 
Conception Act (USCACA) – which barred posthumous children from being 
legally recognised as the children of the deceased.91 This uniform law has 
since been repealed and was re-codified in 2000 with the promulgation of the 
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).92  
The UPA was passed by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law, in order to create some consistency on survivor benefits 
and has since been adopted in 12 states.93 The UPA, unlike the USCACA, 
creates circumstances in which posthumously conceived children can be 
granted legal recognition as the child of the deceased, if the deceased 
consented in writing to be recognised as the child’s father.94 The UPA did not 
establish any time limits in this regard, and has been criticised for allowing 
disturbance of a deceased’s estate years after the deceased’s death if the 
                                                      
 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Starr op cit note 85 at 636. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Teitelbaum op cit note 6 at 436. This Act applies to both PC and PEI – see section 707. 
94 Starr op cit note 85 at 637. 
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surviving spouse elects to wait before exercising the choice of using PR.95 
Why this is undesirable is because PR allows for the delays almost indefinitely 
the existence a person who, once born, would have legal claim to the estate. 
Cryopreserved sperm or embryos may stay that way for years and potentially 
decades, and this creates practical issues since the deceased’s estate can 
never truly be finalised if a surviving partner has access to their gametes or an 
embryo the deceased contributed a gamete to, which could result in a child 
who would have a claim to the estate if that genetic material was used for 
reproductive purposes. 
The UPA was the precursor to the most recent uniform law to deal with PR – 
the Uniform Probate Code of 2008, which deals with the parentage and 
inheritance of children resulting from MAR.96 While the content of the UPC is 
in many ways a duplication of the UPA, there are important differences 
between the two statutes, particularly relating to the parentage of posthumous 
children as a result of the two amendments to the UPC in 2011. The first of 
these amendments, section 2-120, applies to children born via artificial 
fertilisation (AF) where the gestational mother is the intended parent, and the 
second, section 2-121, applies to children born from AF where the gestational 
mother is not the intended parent, regardless of whether she is also the 
genetic mother – otherwise known as a surrogacy arrangement. 
The primary distinction between the UPA and the UPC is that while the UPA 
limited itself to married couples, the UPC includes all persons who might make 
use of MAR – including the unmarried, same-sex couples and single 
persons.97 In providing for PR after the death of one parent, section 2-120 
goes further than the UPA in that it is not subject to written prior consent of the 
deceased, but may also be allowed if the surviving partner adduces proof of 
the deceased having wanted to function as a parent no later than 2 years after 
                                                      
 
95 Starr op cit note 85 at 636. 
96 Knaplund op cit note 83 at 901. 
97 Ibid. 
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the child’s birth.98 Alternatively, the surviving partner must show clear and 
convincing evidence of wanting to be a parent to a posthumous child.99 There 
is a presumption that the deceased consented to PR, if the deceased man was 
married to the surviving mother of a posthumous child – provided there was no 
divorce pending at the time of his death.100 Another key distinction is that the 
UPC provides a time limit; the posthumous child must be in utero within 36 
months of the death or born within 45 months of the death. This prevents the 
problem of deceased estates being open to claims by posthumous children 
indefinitely that the UPA was criticised for. Knaplund praises this provision, 
claiming it allows for finality in winding up estates in a timely manner, while 
also allowing space for the spouse to grieve.101 
In section 2-121 surrogacy arrangements, the UPC also allows for a deceased 
person to be recognised as the parent of a child born through surrogacy – 
provided there is either a written record of their consent or the existence of 
other facts and circumstances establishing the individual's intent by clear and 
convincing evidence.102 The marital presumption of consent also applies here, 
provided the deceased’s gametes were used and the surviving spouse 
functions as a parent of the child within two years of the child's birth.103 
Uniform laws in the US have had limited success in creating a national 
standard for the regulation of MAR. As alluded to above, few states have 
enacted the UPA or comparable provisions, and it is anticipated that the UPC 
will have similarly low popularity.104 Many states have opted to create their 
own laws to provide for the legal status of posthumous children, and whether 
they can benefit from being legally recognised as the offspring of deceased 
                                                      
 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Knaplund op cit note 83 at 910. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Knaplund op cit note 83 at 913. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Knaplund op cit note 83 at 901. 
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persons. Some states provide for children born within nine months of their 
parent’s death to be able to inherit from them – but this only applies to cases 
where they were naturally conceived before death and not by AF.105 Others 
have opted to specifically exclude posthumous children from inheriting from 
their deceased parent, such as New York, Virginia and Georgia,106 while in 
other cases where no laws regulating the legal status of posthumous children 
exist, the courts have excluded them from inheriting.107 In the 14 states that 
have enacted laws providing for the legal recognition of posthumous children, 
most require the written consent of the deceased.108 
The one area for which there is clarity throughout the US on whether 
posthumous children may benefit, is social security survivor benefits. This was 
settled by the Supreme Court in Astrue v Capato ex rel. B.N.C.109 In this case, 
a married couple decided to have the husband’s sperm cryopreserved after he 
was diagnosed with oesophageal cancer, because of the possibility of his 
chemotherapy rendering him sterile.110 The husband died, and the wife used 
his sperm to impregnate herself – giving birth to twins 18 months after his 
death. She then applied for the children’s social security insurance benefits 
due to them as the children of deceased, on their behalf, but the Social 
Security Administration denied her request – reasoning that children conceived 
after the death of a parent were only eligible for benefits if they were eligible to 
inherit the wage earner’s property through intestate succession111 The widow 
then appealed the decision to the United States District Court, but was 
unsuccessful there as well. In her appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the 
                                                      
 
105 Knaplund op cit note 83 at 919. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid. 
109 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012), as cited in K Christian ‘It's Not My Fault: Inequality Among 
Posthumously Conceived Children and Why Limiting the Degree of Benefits to Innocent 
Babies is a No-No’ (2017) 36 Mississippi College Law Review 196. 
110 Christian op cit note 109 at 196 
111 Ibid. 
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courts were divided in their interpretation of the relevant statutes. As such, the 
Social Security Administration petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari to provide clarity on this issue. The Supreme Court held that 
posthumous children could not obtain social security survivor benefits, 
because the wording of the laws was not inclusive of posthumous children.112 
Because the national and state law relating to PR has focused on issues 
relating to the legal status of resultant children, the actual practice of PR in the 
US has been regulated largely through guidelines drafted by specialist 
institutions and implemented by individual hospitals.113 For instance, Cornell 
University was tasked with developing guidelines for several New York 
hospitals on PGR; these guidelines propose allowing sperm retrieval and 
presuming the consent of the deceased for this procedure, provided the wife 
consents in writing.114 This is subject to the death having been sudden or due 
to some incommunicable disease nor any diseases that is known to affect 
sperm validity. Retrieval must take place within 24 hours of the husband’s 
death, and sperm must be stored for a minimum of 1 year thereafter. The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, one of the bodies that oversees 
MAR in the US, published a committee opinion on when to honour requests for 
sperm retrieval. 115 They recommend that PGR must only be done if the 
deceased consented to it. In the absence of a written consent document, 
requests for sperm retrieval should only be granted if the surviving wife or life 
partner makes the request.  
 
2.4 Posthumous Reproduction in the United Kingdom 
Unlike the US, the UK has opted for a system that places strict control on PR 
through state legislation. MAR in the UK is regulated primarily by the Human 
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Fertilization and Embryology Act (HFEA). The HFEA came into existence in 
1990 after extensive public consultation, and a report by a 
government-appointed committee called the Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilization and Embryology.116 The report expressed apprehensions about 
PR, which were based on the possibility of it giving rise to psychological 
problems for mothers and children.117 Despite this, the UK legislature opted to 
allow PR in the HFEA, subject to certain conditions.  
In terms of HFEA, persons storing their gametes must consent to doing so in 
writing, and this consent must be inclusive of how the sperm will be used.118 In 
other words, in order for PR to be possible, the deceased must have 
consented to the PR procedure contemplated – be it PC, PEI or PGR. This is 
provided for in Schedule 3 of the HFEA, which prescribes that when consent is 
being obtained from persons storing gametes or embryos, the consent 
document must specify what purposes the reproductive material may be used 
for and what is to be done with it if the gamete provider loses the capacity to 
vary the terms of consent or withdraws their consent. Prior to a gamete 
provider giving consent,  he must have all relevant information communicated 
to him and must receive counselling. The gamete provider must also be made 
aware that he is free to vary the terms of consent or withdraw consent at any 
time prior their reproductive material being used. 
The UK also has a statute that deals specifically with PGR, the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act of 2003, which permits 
the practice and allows for the deceased to be recognised as the child’s father. 
This is provided the deceased consented in writing both to the removal of his 
sperm after his death, and to it being used as well as  to registered as the 
father of the posthumous child.119 A widow using PR who wants to have her 
                                                      
 
116 C Cameron, E Blyth ‘An Emerging Issue in the Regulation of Assisted Conception’ (1998) 
13(9) Human Reproduction 2339. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Bahadur op cit note 7 at 2771. 
119 Peart op cit note 9 at 750. 
26 
 
deceased husband recognised as the child’s father, where there is effective 
consent, must elect to do so in writing within 42 days of the posthumous child’s 
birth – failing which the child is regarded as having no father. If the woman 
entered into a relationship with a new partner, that man will be regarded as the 
posthumous child’s father, unless he did not consent to the PR procedure.120 
The HFEA established an institution responsible for receiving and deciding on 
requests for PR – the Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority. This 
Authority is responsible for applying HFEA and its regulations, as well as for 
licensing fertility clinics and scientists carrying out research on embryos.121 If 
the appropriate consent has been acquired from them the posthumous use of 
gametes or embryos is allowed. However, the HFEA Code of Practice 1995 
states that certain factors must be taken into account before acting in 
accordance with a request for PR.122 These factors include the ability of those 
making the request to provide a stable and supportive environment for the 
child, and their likely ability to provide for the child’s needs. These provisions 
appear to be in place to respond to the concerns raised about the welfare of 
resultant children in the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and 
Embryology’s report. 
Although the UK has been progressive in creating law to deal with PR fairly 
early on, thus preventing extensive litigation that can result from a lack of 
clarity as was the case in the US, the UK courts have still had to confront 
complex legal issues relating to PR – most notably in the case of Regina v 
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority Ex Parte Blood.123 The Blood 
case is one that was not only famous at the time,124 but has also received 
significant attention in the academic literature since and is arguably the most 
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famous case on PR. 125  This case relates to a refusal by the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Authority of Mrs Blood’s application to use her 
deceased husband’s sperm to have a child. The couple had wanted to have 
children and had discussed this at great length, as well as how they would go 
about it; the deceased allegedly had expressed that he had no objection to PR. 
Before they could act on their desire, however, the husband suddenly died 
while in hospital. Shortly after the man’s death, at Blood’s request, the hospital 
staff removed sperm from him – which was then stored. As there was no 
written consent to the procedure as required by the HFEA, the removal of the 
sperm was unlawful, and, as such, Blood was unable to access the sperm and 
use it to have a child.126 After her requests to the authority were denied, she 
appealed the decision and the court, while unable to grant her permission to 
use her husband’s sperm in the UK, gave her permission to export the sperm 
to Belgium, where the laws allowed her to be inseminated by her deceased 
husband’s sperm.127 The court upheld her appeal, despite her contravention 
of HFEA, stating: “Mrs Blood has the right to receive treatment in Belgium with 
her husband‘s sperm unless there are good public policy reasons for not 
allowing this to happen.”128  
The court’s comments and its order illustrate that it believed that there was no 
good reason to bar Blood from fulfilling her desire to have a child with her 
husband’s sperm in another country – even though it was acquired unlawfully 
under UK law. In doing so, the court provided relief to Blood and those who 
sympathised with her case, allowing her to avoid being deprived of the chance 
to fulfil her desire to have her husband’s child, because unexpected events 
had prevented them from recording their desires in writing. So great was the 
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outcry resulting from the Blood case, however, that it spawned a proposal for 
legislative reform of the HFEA, in the form of an amendment bill.129 This Bill 
proposed to give the Authority the discretion to waive the requirement for the 
written consent of the deceased in appropriate circumstances, but ultimately 
this never came to fruition because the Bill could not get sufficient government 
support. The rigid approach taken by the HFEA and the Authority in dealing 
with requests for PR on the issue of prior written consent, has been criticised 
by medical practitioners130 and academics.131 
 
2.5 Posthumous Reproduction in France 
France has the distinction of having the most judicial rulings on PR,132 and as 
a result of this extensive litigation their jurisprudence has been influential in 
Europe and globally.133 The most notable example of this is the case of 
Parpalaix c. Centre d’Etude Creteil Concervation de Supreme Humain, 134 
which came before the High Court of Creteil.  
In this case, the widow of one Alain Parpalaix obtained a court’s approval to be 
inseminated with the sperm of her deceased husband who had died of 
cancer.135 The significance of the Parpalaix case is that it was the first case to 
deal with the issue of whether, posthumously, children are the legal heirs of 
their deceased fathers.136 At the time, France had no law relating to PR, and, 
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as such, the court had to take the initiative in determining whether the practice 
was lawful and how it ought to be regulated. The widow argued she was 
entitled to her husband’s sperm as the natural heir under the law of contract; 
further she contended that although it was not expressly written, her husband 
had intended her to use the sperm to conceive a child after his death.137 Since 
there was no written record of the deceased’s wishes, the court held that his 
wife and parents were in the best position to articulate what his intention was, 
and they had expressed that the deceased had wanted children. 
The court only inquired into what the deceased’s intention was in terms of 
making its decision – as their reasoning was based on the husband’s 
fundamental right to procreate. 138  In reaching this conclusion, the court 
rejected the widow’s argument based on contract, instead reasoning that the 
“fate of the sperm must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn”.139 
The court found that the husband’s act of storing his sperm after discovering 
he had cancer could be taken as tacit consent for its use after his death.140  
While the widow was successful, the court held that the posthumous child 
could not inherit from Alain Parpalaix’s estate.141 The laws of inheritance in 
France at the time provided that any child born more than 300 days after the 
death of the mother's husband, is not presumed to be child of the husband.142 
However, the court found that even if they fell under the presumption of 
paternity, posthumous children are barred from inheriting, because a child 
must exist at the time of death in order to have capacity to inherit either testate 
or intestate.143 
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The court’s decision in Parpalaix received attention internationally and appears 
to have influenced the court’s decision in the US case of Hecht.144 In the 
aftermath of Parpalaix, the Centre d’Etude Creteil Concervation de Supreme 
Humain, which is a government-run sperm bank in Paris where Alain 
Parpalaix’s sperm had been stored, adopted a policy of not permitting PR – 
which was upheld by the French courts.145 This decision by the sperm bank 
was a foreshadowing of the government’s decision in 1994 to pass a law 
specifically forbidding PR – Law 94-654. The state prohibition occurred 
because the government believed that uses such as PR would strain social 
resources and discourage the traditional nuclear family.146  
 
2.6 Posthumous Reproduction in Israel  
Israel has been described as being at the forefront of countries that have 
embraced artificial reproduction; however, as far as PR goes, it has yet to 
establish laws specifically addressing it.147 Instead, medical practitioners in 
Israel find guidance in the 2003 Attorney General of the Government of Israel 
guidelines – which address PR.148 
These guidelines were formulated after discussions held at Israel’s Ministry of 
Justice with the participation of state authorities and relevant experts, and so, 
while they are not binding, they carry significant weight.149 These guidelines 
focus on giving respect to the will of the deceased, and, as such, propose that 
PR is permissible for married persons where the husband specifically and 
explicitly consented to it.150 While the guidelines also acknowledge that if the 
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husband specifically refused, it would not be appropriate to carry out a request 
for PR,151 and the Attorney General proposes a presumption of consent to PR 
if the deceased’s wishes are unclear.152 This is based on the view that, as the 
person requesting PR, the wife is the most reliable source of the deceased’s 
wishes, and there is no societal interest that can justify interference with these 
wishes.153 The guidelines specifically reject as permissible the practice of 
unmarried partners using PR, as well as parents using their deceased child’s 
gametes.154 
In the case of PEI, Israeli law treats embryos differently depending on which 
spouse of a married couple is the surviving spouse. If the surviving spouse is 
the wife, she is allowed to use the embryo for the purposes of MAR 
reproduction within one year of the husband’s death – even if he did not 
consent to it in writing. On the other hand, if the surviving spouse is the 
husband, then the embryos cannot be used.155 
As it relates specifically to the process of PGR, Landau describes the 
provisions of the guidelines as prescribing a two-step procedure.156 The first 
step is the actual sperm retrieval from the deceased, which is permissible 
whether they are married or unmarried, and even if they did not consent. The 
second step is the authorisation for the use of the sperm, and here each 
request is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by the courts, in keeping 
with the man’s dignity and his presumed wishes.157 If the sperm’s use is 
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authorised, the court is then to instruct that the deceased be registered as the 
child’s father.158 
While the above provisions illustrate what the guidelines perceive as being 
permissible in keeping with the values of Israeli law, in practice many 
judgments of the courts relating to PR have granted orders contrary to these 
guideline provisions. In the case of PGR, the jurisprudence of Israeli courts 
has been the most liberal of the five states examined in Part II of this chapter. 
The courts have on numerous occasions permitted PGR, without the 
husband’s explicit consent.159 However, what is most noteworthy, is that the 
courts have not limited granting requests to surviving spouses or partners and 
have permitted the parents of deceased men to use the deceased’s 
posthumously removed sperm to impregnate a female of their choosing.160  
The seminal case on this issue in Israel, is that of Staff Sergeant Keivan 
Cohen, who was killed in action in 2002 at the age of 19.161 After his death, his 
parents had his sperm removed and stored and later successfully petitioned 
the courts for approval to use the sperm to inseminate a female of their 
choice.162 The courts approved the request based on the family’s testimonies 
that he had wanted to become a father.163 The woman who was the recipient 
of Keivan Cohen’s sperm was someone he had never met, and the parents 
selected her from a number respondents who responded to a newspaper 
appeal.164 The courts have since received numerous requests by parents 
seeking to use their deceased child’s sperm to have their own grandchildren, 
and the precedent set by the Cohen case has been followed by the courts.165 
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The law in this area is yet to be settled. This is because the courts have 
neglected to address under what circumstances the posthumous child would 
be entitled to survivor benefits.166 
There is an inconsistency in Israel between the guidelines on PR in the case 
law, and it may be that the guidelines have had no real impact on the state of 
PR in Israel. In some instances (as with PR by parents using the gametes of 
their children), the practice of courts is directly contrary to the guidelines. As 
such, the values espoused in the guidelines are not given effect and PR in 
Israel is for all intents and purposes controlled by the courts.  
 
2.7 Posthumous Reproduction in Spain 
Spain was a pioneer in the area of PR, by being one of the first states to enact 
legislation on PR with Law 35 of 1988, which was permissive of the practice. In 
terms of article 2 of section 2 of this statute, PR was allowed subject to the 
deceased signing a consent document allowing it.  
The 1988 law has since been repealed and replaced with the Law on Assisted 
Human Reproduction Technologies (LAHRT) – a comprehensive health law 
that regulates all of MAR in Spain. In many ways, this law simply subsumed 
the provisions of the old law into article 9 of the LAHRT, which regulates PR. In 
terms of this provision, the use of a person’s gametes after his or her death is 
allowed provided the person requesting their use was the deceased’s spouse 
or partner. As was the position in the old law, the deceased must have 
consented in writing. While these provisions are ostensibly fairly common in 
states that regulate PR, Spain is one of the few states that also prescribes a 
time limit to PR; stored gametes must be used within 12 months of the death of 
gamete provider. This means that the surviving partner must act quickly in 
order to be permitted to use the deceased’s gametes, and this provision 
facilitates posthumous children being born shortly after the death of the 
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gamete provider, in a manner similar to where conception occurs non-coitally 
and where one parent dies during pregnancy.  
PEI is also specifically addressed in article 9; not only is it allowed, but there is 
a presumption that the deceased authorised the embryo implantation after his 
death. The effect of this provision is that embryos that would otherwise have 
been destroyed because consent had not been given by the deceased will not 
be destroyed – but rather used for reproductive purposes. 
 
2.8 Conclusion  
The complexity of balancing all the competing interests relevant to PR is 
reflected in the broad array of approaches that have been taken by states to 
address it. What is clear is that which approach a particular state will take is 
shaped entirely by which of the competing interests it regards as being most 
significant and which steps it perceives as necessary in giving respect to or 
promoting that particular interest. The balancing of interests is relevant to 
every major choice relating to PR, beginning with whether it should be 
permitted or prohibited as a whole or if one particular type of PR merits 
different treatment, and is further relevant to whether it should be regulated by 
laws or guidelines, whether consent is required, if such consent needs to be 
explicit, can be proven or is presumed, whether there should be applicable 
time conditions, and if posthumous children should be allowed to inherit.  
It seems that the first step a state seeking to decide on what measures to 
address PR must take, is to consider the relevant interests and make a 
determination on which of these it gives recognition to and regards as being 
most important. Thereafter, the next step would be to make decisions on how 
best to give effect to those interests. An important consideration at that stage 
would be whether a particular measure will achieve the desired result. For 
instance, if a state regards PR as so offensive to the dignity of the deceased 
that it should not be occur at all, the best way to ensure this, would be through 
a prohibition in the form of legislation as opposed to guidelines that might not 
be followed by medical practitioners. I suggest that there needs to be some 
35 
 
consistency between the interests a state desires to achieve and the measures 
it takes to give recognition to those interests. 
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3. CHAPTER THREE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDICALLY ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTION 
 
How one responds to the various questions posed by PR depends on how one 
perceives the legal status of deceased persons. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, how state regulation in relation to PR practices depends significantly 
on the issue of respect of the deceased’s wishes and bodily integrity – but this 
raises the question of on what basis we do so: is it because the living after 
death have some right/s that entitle them to participate in artificial reproduction 
or is there some other basis for respecting the deceased’s wishes. In order to 
investigate whether the dead have a right to reproduce, this chapter will 
engage with the preliminary issue of what reproductive rights are and how 
procreative liberty is given effect in South Africa – specifically in relation to 
MAR.  
 
3.1 Procreative Liberty and the Meaning of Reproductive Rights 
The phrase “procreative liberty”, as coined by Robertson in his book Children 
of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies, 167  is the 
freedom of an individual to choose whether or not to have children and to 
control the use of one’s own reproductive capacity. 168  Like all liberties, 
procreative liberty is not conceived as creating a positive duty on the state in 
the way of providing resources to reproduce – but rather it creates a negative 
duty on it to refrain from interference with it being exercised. Also, like all 
liberties, Robertson argues in favour of it being treated with “presumptive 
respect because of its central importance to individual meaning, dignity, and 
identity”. 169  When applied to law, what the nomenclature advanced by 
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Robertson discloses, is that the rights relating to choices about human 
reproduction are not to be perceived as self-standing individual reproductive 
rights, but rather when one engages with rights and reproduction, one must 
view procreative liberty as inclusive of all the rights implicated when exercising 
the choice to have children.  
Procreative liberty in South Africa is protected in the Bill of Rights, primarily 
through section 12 of the Constitution, which deals with the freedom and 
security of the person. In terms of subsection 2: 
“Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the 
right- 
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction; …” 
What can be gleaned from this section, is that all persons have the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity and part of that right includes certain 
freedoms including the freedom to make decisions relating to reproduction. 
This section thus goes beyond simply saying persons have the freedom to 
choose to reproduce, it also recognises that persons have rights in making all 
decisions concerning reproduction. It further indicates that the freedom to 
make these choices is regarded as an integral aspect of an individual’s bodily 
and psychological integrity.  
This provision must be read in conjunction with section 27, which is the right to 
health care, food, water and social security. This section specifically refers to 
reproductive health in section 27(1)(a), which states:  
“Everyone has the right to have access to- 
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care; …” 
Section 27(1)(a) places a duty on the state to “take reasonable legislative and 
other measures” to ensure the realisation of the right to reproductive health 
care.170 This might be interpreted as affirming procreative liberty by requiring 
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the state to make law that facilitates health care – including access to 
technology required for MAR.171  
The application of reproductive rights in South Africa has traditionally focused 
on access to contraceptives, access to sterilisation procedures and termination 
of pregnancy.172 These are all instances where individuals, primarily women, 
sought recognition in the law of their procreative liberty to abstain from 
procreation. However, more recently, those who are desiring to procreate have 
been seeking to enforce their procreative liberty to do so through the use of 
medical technology.173 
 
3.2 Procreative Liberty and Medically Assisted Reproduction 
The seminal case on reproductive rights in the use of MAR in South Africa is 
AB and Another v Minister of Social Development, in which the majority of the 
Constitutional Court held that the reproductive right in section 12(2)(a) of the 
Constitution pertains to an individual’s own body and does not extend to the 
body of another; and on this basis found a limitation on the use of surrogacy by 
infertile persons was not an infringement of section 12(2)(a) or any other 
related right, ergo it was justified.174  
The applicant in AB sought to have section 294 of the Children’s Act175 
declared unconstitutional on the basis that the requirement in this section that 
single commissioning parents seeking to undergo surrogacy must contribute 
one of the gametes used in the artificial fertilisation process – excluded her 
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from using surrogacy, since she was infertile and that in doing so this provision 
violated her rights to privacy, reproductive autonomy, dignity, equality and 
access to health care.176 The High Court found in the applicant’s favour,177 
and the matter was then sent to the Constitutional Court to confirm the 
declaration of invalidity in terms of section 167(5) of the Constitution.178 The 
judgment in the Constitutional Court was a divided one,179 which led to two 
extensive judgments; one being the minority supporting the High Court’s 
decision 180  and the other being the majority, that found against the 
applicant.181  
Nkabinde J, writing for the majority, disagreed with the minority on the basis 
that the finding of constitutional invalidity ought not to be upheld, reasoning 
that none of the impugned rights had been infringed. While the majority 
acknowledged the existence and significance of the rights the applicant sought 
to rely upon, the court and found the limitation in section 294 was justified. This 
was on the basis of there being a rational connection between the 
differentiation in this section and the “public good” of creating a bond between 
a child and a commissioning parent.182 In considering the interpretation of 
section 12(2)(a), the majority pointed out that this provision has primarily been 
interpreted to relate to people’s ability to make decisions about their own 
bodies,183 and on this basis Nkabinde J states that:  
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“I acknowledge the need to respect the autonomy of commissioning parents in 
relation to the choices they make, for purposes of concluding surrogacy 
agreements. However, section 12(2)(a) does not give anyone the right to bodily 
integrity in respect of someone else’s body”.184 [own underlining]  
The proper interpretation of section 12(2)(a) was the key issue upon which the 
minority and majority judgments differed. Khampepe J, writing for the minority, 
interpreted this provision as protecting the right of individuals to make 
decisions concerning reproduction.185 Concluding that the freedom to make 
the decision itself is what is protected rather than any particular choice, and, as 
such, a person need only show an inability to make a decision resultant of 
some law or state conduct and that this caused at least psychological harm.186 
In this way, Khampepe J differed from Nkabinde J’s view that an infringement 
of section 12 was conditioned upon there being physical and psychological 
consequences for the person claiming such a violation – meaning that 
reproductive choices were not limited to choices involving one’s own body.  
The difference in these two judgments can be attributed to the different points 
of departure the justices took in viewing the meaning and scope of section 12. 
While Nkabinde J interpreted section 12 as an instance of the protection of 
bodily integrity, thus necessitating that bodies be implicated for a violation to 
occur, Khampepe J took the view that one of the core values of the 
Constitution is that of autonomy, as enshrined in section 1, and this value is 
one of great significance to our society because of its history.187 Khampepe J 
interprets section 12 as a whole under the aegis of the value of autonomy, 
finding that this section “vivifies” the value of autonomy – especially in the case 
of section 12(2)(a) that guards an individual’s autonomy in making 
decisions.188 The justice states that “[t]he emphasis in section 12(2) is thus on 
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whether a law or conduct deprives a person of freedom or security, broadly 
understood”. 189  The fact that a deprivation of one’s freedom has purely 
psychological ramifications, is sufficient for there to have been an infringement 
of their rights190 – as section 12(2)(a) protects both psychological and physical 
integrity as two separate rights.191 
In applying this reasoning to the facts, the minority judgment noted that 
infertility impacts a person’s psychological state in a harmful manner, and 
found that the state has a negative duty to avoid placing barriers in front of 
infertile persons which prevent them from alleviating the effects of this harm.192 
Where the state fails to do so through conduct or law like section 294 of the 
Children’s Act, as it did in AB’s instance, the state is causing harm by depriving 
people like AB of choices to decide whether or not to reproduce.193 In my view, 
the minority’s conception of the meaning and application of section 12 is 
correct – for the reasons stated below.  
Based on the majority’s finding in AB on the limitation of reproductive rights to 
one’s own body, it can be argued that as it stands in South Africa the freedoms 
of persons to use MAR is only protected through section 12(2)(a) insofar as the 
procedure in question involves their body or some part of it. The interpretation 
of section 12(2) given in AB has been criticised, and justifiably so, for 
conflating the protection of bodily and psychological integrity, and Van Niekerk 
submits there is reason to interpret psychological integrity as a self-standing 
right and not as dependent on bodily integrity as it was interpreted to be in this 
case.194 To interpret the section in this manner would provide a basis for 
persons like the applicant in AB to challenge limitations on the exercise of their 
reproductive choices where they negatively impact on their psychological 
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integrity – even though their bodies (specifically their reproductive material) 
are not involved in the reproductive act. In my view, this interpretation of the 
section is correct, in that it fully embraces MAR under the protection of section 
12(2) – thereby giving  respect to procreative liberty in acknowledging that 
exercising reproductive choices has to do with more than just controlling your 
body. To a significant extent, the act of reproduction is about fulfilling the 
personal desire to have a child and to be denied the fulfilment of this desire 
undoubtedly has a detrimental psychological impact on a person.  
As discussed above, procreative liberty enjoins the state not to create barriers 
to exercising reproductive choices, and Robertson would likely object to the 
ruling in AB. He observes, correctly in my view, that while the value of 
procreative liberty is widely acknowledged in the case of coital reproduction, 
the same is not the case with MAR, and he argues that “it should be equally 
honored when reproduction requires technological assistance”. 195  The 
majority judgement in AB has the effect of giving constitutional protection to all 
reproductive choices in relation to coital reproduction, while only giving 
protection to some reproductive choices in relation to non-coital reproduction. 
While Robertson’s argument appears to be consistent with the Constitution’s 
commitment to the equal treatment of all persons,196 the finding in AB still 
stands as the most authoritative interpretation of section 12(2), and, as such, 
persons who either choose or need medical assistance in having children, do 
not enjoy the same protections as those who do not. It has, however, been 
argued that MAR might find further protection elsewhere, in section 14 of the 
Constitution – the right to privacy, on the basis that this right has been 
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interpreted as including the liberty to live life as one pleases without being 
interfered with.197  
Procreative liberty is rooted in the protection of individual liberties, and, as 
such, human dignity is necessarily implicated by its promotion or limitation. 
The Constitutional Court acknowledges in AB the relationship between the 
freedom to make choices concerning reproduction as per section 12(2), as well 
as equality in sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution where it states “It cannot be 
gainsaid that inherent human dignity is at the heart of individual rights, 
including the right to equality.”198 It follows from this that the various rights that 
constitute an individual’s procreative liberty are supported by section 10 and 
any infringement of these rights would also be an infringement of the right to 
dignity.  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks on Procreative Liberty 
The concept of procreative liberty provides a framework within which to 
understand the freedom to make choices relating to human reproduction, as 
protected not only in provisions which grant persons the freedom to exercise 
the choice to have children or to abstain from doing so, but also through the 
web of interrelated and mutually reinforcing human rights that reaffirm human 
liberties in exercising decisions relating to procreation. Based on the above, 
procreative liberty in South Africa is inclusive of the right to reproductive 
autonomy is section 12(2)(a), the right to reproductive health care services in 
section 27(1)(a), privacy in section 14, equality in section 9, and dignity in 
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section 10. However, inasmuch as South African law gives effect to 
procreative liberty in the case of coital conception, it appears that an 
individual’s procreative liberty is not regarded as being equally significant in 
the case of MAR.  
 
3.4 New Frontiers for Procreative Liberty: NC v Aevitas Fertility Clinic 
While the application of procreative liberty to certain reproductive choices is 
clear, the question remains if this right extends to PR in South Africa. PR was 
addressed for the first time in South African case law in the case of NC v Drs 
Aevitas Inc t/a Aevitas Fertility Clinic.199 The applicant, NC, sought an order 
declaring that she was entitled to use her deceased husband’s sperm in order 
to have a child.200 NC is the widow of MC, having married him in 2008 after a 
lengthy relationship.201 Prior to their marriage, MC was diagnosed with lung 
cancer in 2003. The couple desired to have children of their own. However, 
even after MC’s cancer was no longer an obstacle – these plans were set back 
by NC being diagnosed with kidney disease that made it life threatening for her 
to fall pregnant.202  
The desire to have their own child compelled the couple to explore other 
avenues and they looked into taking the route of surrogacy; however, before 
they could act on this, MC’s cancer reoccurred in 2012.203 As part of his 
treatment, MC had to undergo chemotherapy and since this carries the risk of 
rendering a man infertile, the couple chose to have his sperm cryopreserved in 
order to preserve their dream of having children of their own.204 MC’s sperm 
was stored at Aevitas Fertility Clinic, and when MC went to have his sperm 
removed, he filled out their standard form which contained a section where the 
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patient may choose what is to happen to their sperm after their death.205 MC 
made the election in this section that, in the event that he dies, his sperm 
should be assigned to the care of his wife.206 
In the years after the sperm was stored at Aevitas Fertility Clinic, the couple 
continued to pay the annual fee to keep the sperm cryopreserved on the basis 
that their desire to have children of their own persisted.207 Despite treatment, 
MC’s health deteriorated, and eventually he died in January 2017.208 In July 
2017, six months later, NC felt she had overcome her grief at her husband’s 
death, and was ready to proceed to have the child the couple had always 
wanted. 
Upon discovering, however, that the legality of PR in South Africa is unclear, 
she brought an application before the High Court to confirm her right to use her 
husband’s sperm.209 In concluding her affidavit in support of this application, 
NC highlights that she based the crux of her claim on the recognition of the 
autonomy of her now-deceased husband to choose to assign his sperm to her 
and intending that she use it:  
“In our society, persons’ reproductive choices are deeply respected. I am 
requesting the court to extend this respect to the reproductive choice that my 
deceased husband made – and recording in writing – while he was still alive”.210 
This was reflected in the arguments made before the court. Counsel for the 
applicant argued that part of the deceased’s right to reproductive autonomy 
while alive was the right to determine the fate of one’s own body – which 
includes gametes.211 Counsel further submitted that NC also potentially had a 
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legal claim here, since the decision to have a child through PC is an exercise 
of both the deceased husband’s autonomy and that of the surviving wife who 
was assigned his sperm.212  
Notably, counsel for NC did not place reliance on constitutional rights and 
instead based his arguments on the common law right to autonomy that all 
patients engaged in medical procedures have, and that their medical 
practitioners are obliged to give respect to.213 The significance of this is that, 
unlike reproductive autonomy as interpreted in AB, autonomy under the 
common law is not limited to the body and can also apply to patient autonomy 
for purely psychological treatment. Patient autonomy in the context of human 
reproduction is of particular importance to MAR, because these procedures 
necessarily require medical procedures carried about by a medical 
professional. The patient’s right to autonomy stems from the doctor–patient 
relationship, a contractual relationship that comes into existence the moment 
the patient places themselves in the doctor’s care.214 The duty on doctors to 
respect a patient’s autonomy is one of the fundamental ethical duties on 
doctors, 215  and failing to respect patient autonomy can have serious 
implications. 216  In respecting patient autonomy, it is of fundamental 
importance that a doctor obtain full and proper consent to perform a procedure 
such as the removal of gametes.217  
The High Court granted the relief sought and held that NC had the right to use 
her deceased husband’s sperm.218 While this judgment ostensibly confirms 
the legality of PC, the fact that the court did not give reasons for its decisions 
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leaves various pertinent issues unaddressed. For instance, it is unclear if this 
judgment is to be viewed as indicating that in light of all the applicable laws and 
regulations, PC, in particular, is lawful or whether the same can also be said of 
PEI and PGR. While these PR procedures are also unregulated in South 
African law and similar considerations apply, there are important distinctions 
between them that might merit a different outcome in terms of questions 
regarding their legality.  
Another issue relates to the basis upon which the court found in the applicant’s 
favour. Procreative liberty was evidently a driving force of the arguments 
advanced by NC and her legal counsel, but while it is clear this would apply to 
the husband’s choice to have the sperm removed and stored, it is not as clear 
that procreative liberty includes the freedom to decide what happens to your 
reproductive material after you die. If the court based its finding on the 
deceased’s rights, then that would mean that the rights included in procreative 
liberty survive death – even though many would argue that the dead do not 
have legal rights.219  
If instead the court’s judgment is to be seen as a recognition of the surviving 
spouse’s rights, this raises the question of whether this is based on contractual 
rights over the property that is the deceased’s reproductive material or whether 
the rights to use a deceased’s gametes can be said to be part of one’s 
procreative liberty. If the latter is the case, this raises the possibility that the 
decision in Aevitas is inconsistent with the ruling in AB, which seemingly 
established that procreative liberty is limited to your own reproductive material 
(as part of your body) and not that of another – ergo NC did not have a 
constitutionally recognised right to use her husband’s sperm. It is clear that the 
judgment in Aevitas, while giving a preliminary answer to the question of 
whether PR is legal in South Africa, raised a plethora of complex questions 
that need to be addressed. In seeking to respond to some of these questions, 
the following chapter discusses the ethical and legal issues relating to PR. 
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4. CHAPTER FOUR: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN POSTHUMOUS 
REPRODUCTION 
 
This chapter will outline the legal and ethical issues relating to PR, by looking 
at the relationship between persons and their reproductive material while alive 
and how this relationship is impacted by death. The issues identified will be 
applied to the South African context with reference to the applicable laws and 
regulations relating to MAR. Based on the analysis in this chapter, it will 
conclude with arguments on the legal position in South Africa regarding PR.  
 
4.1 The Relationship Between People and Reproductive Material 
At the core of it, PR is about the nature of the legal bond between persons and 
their gametes and embryos, and whether this relationship includes the right to 
dispose of your reproductive material as you wish – even after you die. In order 
to conclude how reproductive material is to be treated after death, it is first 
necessary to understand the nature of a person’s interest in their reproductive 
material while alive.220 This is the subject of significant debate, as there are 
various ways in which this dynamic is conceptualised. One position is that we 
may regard reproductive material as property, in which case property rights 
generally give broad decision-making authority to individuals from whom the 
reproductive material originates; the owner of property has extensive powers 
in controlling property, its use and how it is disposed of to the exclusion of 
others. 221  Alternatively, gametes might be regarded as part of one’s 
personhood, and regard embryos as full persons. In that case there is reason 
for greater restrictions being placed on how reproductive material is used to 
ensure respect for the “special significance” of gametes and embryos.222 This 
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is of relevance to MAR, because, historically, reproductive material could 
easily be classified as part of your body by virtue of gametes and embryos 
being unable to survive for very long outside of the body. However, now they 
can exist outside the body for extended periods of time and can be transferred 
to others and used by persons other than the individual from whom they 
originate – for reproductive purposes.  
Schiff, in his analysis of how the nature of the human reproductive material in 
the case of MAR has been debated, identifies three major ethical positions that 
emerge in debates about the status of the human embryo.223 The first view is 
that embryos are persons from the moment of conception, and, as such, are 
deserving of the full respect given to all human beings.224 This view is used as 
a basis to argue against any practices that are perceived as harming the 
embryo and to support embryos that have been created for reproductive 
purposes being implanted.225 This view has been challenged by those who 
perceive human personhood as beginning at birth and who argue that embryos 
do not contain the characteristics that are necessary for a human being to 
have legal recognition.226 The second view on the status of embryos is one in 
which they are regarded as property – ergo their owners have sole rights as to 
their disposition.227 This view is criticised for not recognising that unlike other 
human tissue that is often treated in this manner, an embryo deserves greater 
respect because of its potential for life.228 
In-between these two diametrically opposed views is a third, intermediate 
position, in terms of which embryos are seen as more than human tissue but at 
the same time not as a person.229 In terms of this view, while not considered 
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as having a claim to the same entitlements as a person, the embryo is 
regarded as being entitled to special respect due to its potential to become a 
person, and it has powerful symbolic meaning. As such, those who have 
created embryos have an ownership interest in embryos; however, this 
authority is limited within the scope set by the law.230 In Schiff’s view, the case 
law in the US affirms the concept of embryos as this intermediate class of 
property and this can be extended to gametes, and further opines that while 
gametes are properly characterised as property rather than as persons, they 
are distinguishable from ordinary property because of the close relationship 
they bear with the personhood of the gamete provider. 231  Due to their 
life-carrying potential and the fact that they carry non-replicable characteristics, 
he states that gametes are to be regarded as intrinsically and vitally connected 
to the personhood of the person from whom they originate.232 
 
4.2 Do the Dead Have Rights? 
The response to this question from most persons with a legal training would 
likely be to reject the idea that the dead have rights;233 however, upon closer 
inspection, this matter is not as clear-cut as it seems. There are legal rules that 
suggest that the dead do not have legal rights. For instance it is common to 
find in various state laws that the dead cannot marry, divorce, or vote.234 
Conversely, other legal rules seem to indicate that the dead have rights, 
because they call for the deceased’s rights to be respected even after they die 
– such as how testamentary distributions may be dictated by wills, the 
honouring of burial requests, and organ donation designations.235  
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At this point it is important to clarify that when we speak of the dead having 
rights, this is not a reference to dead bodies as being regarded as legal 
subjects. Rather, the dead having rights refers to legal subjectivity not 
terminating with death, and the rights a person had while living have legal force 
even after they are dead.236 Smolensky points out that, in concluding whether 
rights survive death, one must consider what rights are and whether the end of 
one’s life is also fatal to a person’s capacity as a legal subject.237  
Proponents of posthumous rights favour the Interest Theory of rights, as this 
theory best accommodates the concept. 238  The Interest Theory, as 
propounded by Joseph Raz, reasons that a legal right comes into existence 
where an individual holds a sufficiently strong or important interest that it is 
justifiable that the said interest imposes a duty on another person.239 Interest 
Theory prescribes that legal subjectivity is based on whether or not the 
individual has interests, even if he cannot express them.240 Arguments for the 
existence of posthumous rights are usually based on two points: the first is that, 
deriving from Interest Theory, some interests may survive death and these 
interests are those that are legally protected in the form of rights, and secondly 
that the law commonly already recognises that individuals are free to make 
decisions while alive as to certain posthumous events such as what happens 
to their property or their bodies after death. 
Feinberg, one of the main proponents of the concept of posthumous interests, 
suggests that some of a man’s interests survive death, “just as some of the 
debts and claims of his estate”, and, accordingly, we can think of a person as 
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harmed by posthumous events.241 This is based on the idea that not all 
interests are conditioned upon subjective experience, and one may have an 
interest in knowing a particular event will happen – even if that event occurs 
after death.  
The concept of posthumous interests is often used to support the need for 
explicit prior consent for PR by the deceased, and the objection to consent 
being presumed because it may be inconsistent with the deceased’s 
wishes.242 The reasoning behind this, as described by Bahadur, is that certain 
acts committed after a person’s death can harm or promote a person’s 
interests. 243  Without a person having consented to PR, it deprives an 
individual of the opportunity to be the conclusive author of a highly significant 
chapter of his life. Therefore, Bahadur submits that only if there is clear 
evidence of a desire to reproduce posthumously, is PR respectful to the 
deceased’s posthumous interests.244 In supporting these claims it is stated 
that:  
“By honouring the decedent’s wishes, even to the detriment of living persons, the 
law is respecting the ability of people to make autonomous decisions that extend 
beyond the grave. In recognising these interests and giving the estate claim rights, 
privileges, powers and immunities, the law [i]s recognising that the dead have 
legal rights.”245 
Without seeking to accept or reject the idea of posthumous interests, I suggest 
that the existence of posthumous interests does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the dead retain the rights they had while living. There are 
reasons to believe that they do not – including the practical implications of this 
concept. Any argument in favour of posthumous rights must account for the 
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challenge that, even if one might say rights can survive death, there are some 
rights that clearly are not appropriate to apply to the dead.246 And if we say 
some rights survive death and some do not – how do we determine the ones 
that do? 
Smolensky, who argues in favour of posthumous rights as the basis of PR, in 
analysing how the wishes of the deceased have been given legal recognition 
in the USA, states that this turns on whether a record exists of the particular 
interest in question – as only interests capable of being known by the living, left 
behind by the deceased, are capable of being protected by law.247 While this 
would account for things such as wills and organ designations, as well as 
accommodating reproductive autonomy as surviving death – if there exists a 
record of the deceased’s wishes – it would raise the question of whether other 
rights such as the right to vote or marry ought to survive as well. The deceased 
are not generally regarded as being capable of voting or marrying, even if they 
left a written record of their desire to do so.248 The reason for this is because 
of the absence of a legal subject to exercise the rights in question. Once we 
die, we are incapable of going to cast a ballot or attending a wedding 
ceremony, but the same can be said about exercising reproductive autonomy. 
And, as such, if we do not give legal recognition to a written record on how one 
would like to vote or one’s desire to be married, based on posthumous rights, 
then it should follow that we do not give legal recognition to a deceased’s 
wishes to reproduce after death on the basis of posthumous rights.249  
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One possible response to why certain rights might survive death, would be that  
human rights only survive death insofar as they protect a person’s right to 
make decisions regarding things he or she owned or had a similar proprietary 
interest in. In these terms, your will is honoured, because your right to own and 
control property survives death and your decisions regarding what happens to 
your body (including your organs and your reproductive material) ought to be 
honoured – because your right to bodily integrity survives death. This would 
resolve the issues relating to why some rights survive death and others do not, 
but this argument does not respond to all the pertinent issues. Other issues 
related to posthumous rights include whether posthumous rights are to be 
treated the same as the rights of the living, and, if not, on what basis,250 and 
what is to happen when the rights of the living conflict with those of the 
dead.251  
Clearly there are challenges to conceptualising the deceased as having rights 
in the sense that we perceive the living to have rights. These challenges to the 
legal recognition of the deceased’s wishes may be resolved by acknowledging 
that while the deceased’s wishes do have certain legal recognition in law, this 
does not stem from the ongoing legal subjectivity of the deceased.  
 
4.3 An Alternative to Posthumous Rights: Social Utility 
The notion that rules respecting the deceased’s wishes give support to the 
concept of posthumous rights, is based on the assumption that the primary 
reason why lawmakers might recognise the wishes of deceased persons as 
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worthy of being given legal protection, is that the dead have an ongoing 
interest in their bodies and property being treated with respect for their dignity 
and in accordance with their autonomy. Slabbert argues that there are at least 
two other reasons lawmakers might potentially recognise the wishes of the 
deceased. The first is that living people care about what happens to their 
bodies after death and the state may want to give them confidence that their 
wishes will be respected after death; and the second is that the society within 
which one lives wishes to see itself as a society that treats the dead with 
respect, and this desire is of sufficient import that it has been given effect to in 
law.252 These two reasons form the foundation for the idea that the wishes of 
the dead are honoured through legal rules, not because the law seeks to 
protect the interests of the deceased but rather the interests of society and the 
state - and this is the concept of social utility.  
Robertson recognises that the wishes of the deceased are given legal 
recognition, and in places such as the US are even constitutionally protected. 
However, in justifying why this is the case, Robertson states that this is done 
because they serve socially important purposes rather than being an instance 
of rights surviving death: “[W]ills provide incentives to work and acquire 
property ... [and] enable one to care for family and relatives”.253 As such, 
under the concept of social utility the wishes of the dead are honoured 
because there are significant goals of social importance served by doing so. 
This illustrates the social utility of giving legal protection to things like the 
wishes of the of the dead, but this is always subject to the limitation that it does 
not directly harm or infringe the rights of the living or have some significant 
negative impact on society based on societal values or state interests. 
Robertson takes the view that social utility does not provide a basis for PR 
since, unlike in the case of wills, “[s]ocial goals of equivalent importance are 
not present in directions for posthumous reproduction”.254 It is submitted that 
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this is not necessarily the case, and on the reasons put forward by Slabbert the 
state might permit directives for PR in order to give people, while alive, 
confidence that their wishes will be respected after death or society might 
perceive it is consistent with the respectful treatment of the dead, because it is 
giving effect to the deceased’s wishes regarding his or her reproductive 
material as part of his or her body.  
Cate finds the idea of social utility accounting for legal rules that give respect to 
the wishes of the deceased unconvincing. In his view the fact that these laws 
often allow things like testamentary provisions that are not rational nor socially 
constructive, indicates that the focus of these legal rules is the autonomy of the 
now-deceased, expressed while alive.255 In rejecting social utility he refers to 
organ donation, where common legal rules insist on the deceased’s consent 
for his organs to be harvested after death. As Cate sees it, if laws relating to 
the dead are based on the benefit to surviving persons, how is it then that we 
as a society, “tolerate the burying every year of the very organs and tissues 
that could save the lives of thousands of identified people on the transplant 
waiting lists”.256 On this account, society ostensibly gives significant weight to 
the individual’s autonomy, even after death, and this indicates that autonomy is 
a right that survives death.  
I suggest that objections such as these do not indicate that the deceased are 
bearers of rights and can be accounted for on the basis that respect for the 
dead is something socially regarded as being very important, and, as such, a 
significant amount of value is placed on this by law makers. To illustrate this, 
one can consider legal rules that protect dead human bodies. These may be 
justified on the basis that the dead enjoy some form of bodily integrity – as 
some who object to PGR do.257 However, as Young points out, the fact that 
corpses are legally protected does not mean that corpses have legal rights any 
more than the fact that heritage buildings are legally protected means that 
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those buildings have legal rights.258 The same could be said of the deceased’s 
wishes. The fact that we protect them does not mean we regard the dead as 
having rights. Under the concept of social utility, we give legal recognition to 
the deceased’s wishes, not because there is a posthumous right in property, 
for example, but because the interests of the living in what happens to their 
assets is highly significant, and providing for the distribution of property 
through wills provides for an orderly system of dealing with assets of deceased 
persons, while also allowing living persons the security of knowing that their 
wishes will be respected. 
 
4.4 Approaches to Posthumous Reproduction: Posthumous Rights vs 
Social Utility  
PR raises multiple issues regarding our relationship with our reproductive 
material and how our entitlement to control our reproductive material is 
affected by death, and there are no simple answers to these questions. The 
significant debate over ethical and legal issues relating to PR is reflected in the 
myriad of different approaches taken by states that address PR, as is indicated 
in Chapter 2. This dissension is reflected even among states that permit some 
or all PR procedure. However, certain common approaches can be identified 
based on the way a state views the dead, the significance of their wishes and 
what the best way to respect them may be. In outlining the various ethical 
positions that inform policy on PR in jurisdictions that are permissive of it, three 
approaches are described by Katz: the Permissive Approach, the Restrictive 
Approach and the Hybrid Approach. While Katz categorises these approaches 
in the context of PGR, it is suggested that they are reflected when one looks at 
PR as a whole.  
 
Proponents of restrictive legislation or standards regarding PR frame their 
arguments in support of PR in terms of individual autonomy and procreative 
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liberty; however, they also express concern over the respectful treatment of 
the deceased’s body.259 Under the restrictive view, PR is permissible but all 
procedures relating to the deceased’s own body (including their reproductive 
material) are subject to consent having been obtained from the deceased 
before their death.260 This view is supported by the concept of posthumous 
rights, as such respect for the autonomy and bodily integrity of the deceased is 
regarded as the most important consideration in deciding whether PR is 
permissible. 
With the Permissive Approach, respect for the dead is argued to be best 
served by allowing PR, thereby satisfying the deceased’s interests in 
parenthood, which he or she was unable to fulfil while alive, and based on a 
general desire deemed to be held by individuals to have children.261 Ergo, PR 
ought to be allowed whenever a request is made, unless the deceased 
explicitly refused PR or there is no meaningful evidence that the deceased 
desired to be a parent. 262  This approach defends arguments about the 
reproductive autonomy of the deceased not being respected, with the retort 
that a mere lack of contemplation by the deceased of a particular use of his or 
her body or gametes is not a necessary nor sufficient condition for the 
disrespectful use of the deceased’s body.263 In other words, the deceased’s 
body is not disrespected nor are his or her wishes thwarted, because there no 
consent was given for the PR procedure. Under the permissive approach 
consent is not required for PR and may even be presumed. This approach is 
supported by the concept of social utility in honouring the deceased’s wishes, 
and, as such, the main consideration is not the deceased’s ‘rights’, but whether 
PR is consistent with the social value of the respectful treatment of the dead.  
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The Hybrid Approach takes a stance between the two approaches above, as it 
relates to how best to respect the wishes of the now-deceased individual. 
Under this approach, some affirmative proof or evidence of the deceased’s 
wish to procreate after death for PR is to be allowed, in the form of the 
reasonably informed consent of the deceased.264 As such, consent by the 
deceased may be proven in court and need not be in writing. It is suggested 
that this approach may also be supported by social utility, albeit it gives greater 
weight to the need for consent in giving respect for the deceased’s wishes than 
the Permissive Approach.  
Evidently, the legal status of PR will depend on the particular approach taken 
by a state regarding reproductive material and whether individuals have a say 
in what happens to it after death. In order to determine where South Africa falls 
in this debate, consideration must be given to the existing legal framework 
regarding reproductive material and how rights are affected by death in our 
law. 
 
4.5 The Law Relating to Posthumous Reproduction in South Africa 
Reproductive material in South Africa is provided for primarily in Chapter 8 of 
the National Health Act (NHA),265 as well as in related regulations including 
the Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilization of Persons (RRAFP).266 In 
Chapter 8 – entitled “Control of Use of Blood, Blood Products, Tissue and 
Gametes in Humans” – the NHA places strict controls on the procedures 
relating to the removal of reproductive material from living persons. For 
instance, only specified persons may remove sperm from a man for the 
purposes of MAR, and the sperm must be stored in a frozen state or 
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cryopreserved immediately upon removal,267 while sperm removal must be 
done with the written consent of the man it is being removed from.268  
Whether the NHA and its regulations apply to PR, particularly PGR, is however 
unclear. In terms of section 56(1) of the NHA: “A person may use tissue or 
gametes removed or blood or a blood product withdrawn from a living person 
only for such medical or dental purposes as may be prescribed.” Van Niekerk 
interprets this section as excluding PGR, because it indicates only the 
gametes of living persons can be used.269 In my view the unlawfulness of 
PGR cannot be inferred merely because the provisions of the NHA and its 
regulations specifically refer to gamete removal from living persons, and not 
the dead. This interpretation, I suggest, misconstrues this provision as stating 
that only gametes removed from the living can be used when, instead, on a 
plain reading, section 56(1) prescribes how gametes removed from living 
persons may be used. The interpretation for which I argue is reinforced by 
regulation 2 of the RRAFP, which states that “These regulations only apply to 
the withdrawal of gametes from and for use in living persons.” What this 
indicates is that the current law in South Africa only addresses gamete 
removal from the living, and there is a lacuna in the law as it pertains to 
gamete withdrawal from the dead. If it is true that by virtue of being omitted 
from the terms of section 56(1), PGR is unlawful, it would follow that all PR is 
unlawful by virtue of omission from the terms of the NHA. In my view, this 
conclusion is incorrect, and this work shall proceed on this basis.  
Regulation 10 of the RRAFP also potentially excludes PGR in that it stipulates 
that no gamete, “that has not been imported, removed or withdrawn in terms of 
the provisions of the [National Health Act] or these regulations … may be used 
for artificial fertilisation”. This provision could be interpreted as excluding 
gamete removal, since none of the provisions in the NHA provide for it 
specifically. I suggest that the proper interpretation of this regulation requires 
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that it be read with regulation 2, which provides that the RRAFP “only apply to 
the withdrawal of gametes from and for use in living persons.” Thus, the 
exclusion of the use of gametes contemplated in regulation 10, is limited to 
excluding the use of gametes withdrawn from living persons for reproductive 
purposes, where this was not done in accordance with the NHA and the 
RRAFP. As such, this provision could be reformulated as saying “no gamete 
withdrawn from living persons may be used for artificial fertilization if it was not 
so withdrawn in terms of the National Health Act and its Regulations”. When 
interpreted in this way, regulation 10 can be seen to compel compliance with 
the standards set by the RRAFP and the NHA, in prohibiting the use of 
gametes for MAR, where they were not withdrawn by a specified person, at a 
specified institution, with the written consent of the gamete provider, and in 
accordance with all the prescribed conditions. It is suggested that this was the 
purpose the legislature sought to achieve here, and not the exclusion of PGR, 
which was likely not contemplated in the drafting of this provision.  
 
4.6 The Legal Status of Reproductive Material 
MAR is directly addressed in the RRAFP, which regulates the use of both 
artificial fertilisation and embryo transfer technologies. 270  The RRAFP 
addresses artificial fertilisation in regulation 2. However, it does so only in 
relation to the removal of gametes from living persons as discussed above, 
and the law is silent on the removal of gametes from deceased persons. 
Persons from whom gametes are removed are referred to as “gamete donors” 
under the RRAFP,271 and the regulations provide for two categories of gamete 
donor: general donors, who are generally persons who have their gametes 
                                                      
 
270 Artificial fertilisation in the regulations is defined as “the introduction by other than natural 
means of a male gamete or gametes into the internal reproductive organs of a female person 
for the purpose of human reproduction and includes artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, 
gamete intrafallopian tube transfer, embryo intrafallopian transfer or intracytoplasmic sperm 
injection” and embryo transfer is defined as “the placing of the embryo into the uterus or 
fallopian tube of the recipient.” 
271 Regulation 1 provides that gamete donors are “a living person from whose body a gamete 
or gametes are removed or withdrawn, for the purpose of artificial fertilisation”.  
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removed and stored at an authorised institution (such as a sperm or egg bank) 
for the purposes of acting as an anonymous donor for the artificial fertilisation 
of persons unknown to them;272 and spousal donors, who are persons who 
have their gametes removed for the purposes of engaging in artificial 
reproduction with their partner. Whether one is a general donor or a spousal 
donor has an impact on the legal relationship between that person and their 
reproductive material once it is removed.  
In terms of the RRAFP, reproductive material is capable of being owned by 
both natural and juristic persons. In the case of a male general donor, before 
gametes have been removed and received by an authorised institution, they 
are owned by the general donor.273 After the gametes have been received, but 
before artificial fertilisation occurs, ownership vests in the authorised 
institution.274 With a female general donor, prior to artificial fertilisation both 
before and after removal and receipt by an authorised institution, she is the 
owner of the gametes.275 In the case of a male spousal donor, the ownership 
of the husband’s gametes vests in him both before and after they have been 
withdrawn and received by the authorised institution. 276  As with female 
general donors, female spousal donors are the owners of gametes removed 
from them both before and after removal and receipt by an authorised 
institution.277As for embryos, the RRAFP provide that once conception occurs 
via artificial insemination, ownership of the resultant embryo vests in the 
                                                      
 
272  The identity of general donors is usually kept a secret, as authorised persons are 
prohibited from disclosing their particulars, except pursuant to a court order or where some 
other law provides otherwise, see, Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons 
regulation 19. 
273 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(1)(a)(i). 
274 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(1)(a)(ii). 
275 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(1)(a)(i). 
276 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(1)(b). 
277 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(1)(c). 
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woman in whose reproductive organs the embryo is to be transferred, who is 
referred to as the intended recipient.278  
In order to better illustrate the impact of these regulations, they shall be applied 
to the factual scenario in Aevitas, with modifications where necessary. In this 
scenario, where a married couple undergoes the process of using MAR to 
have children, the provisions relating to spousal donors will apply. As such, 
where MC had his sperm stored for future use at Aevitas Fertility Clinic, up 
until his death he would have been the owner of the cryopreserved sperm. Had 
the roles been reversed and NC had been the one who had stored her eggs, 
up until her death she too would have been the owner. If NC and MC were not 
a married couple, then the provisions as to general donors would apply, in 
which case Aevitas Fertility Clinic would have been the owners of MC’s sperm. 
However, if it was NC who had donated her eggs, then she would retain 
ownership over them. From this, it seems that the RRAFP only intended for 
married couples to be able to donate sperm for the purposes of undergoing 
MAR with their partner.  
In the case of embryos, had MC and NC planned at the time of the removal of 
his sperm, to have NC be the person who would carry the child, then she 
would have had ownership over the embryo. If, however, at the time of artificial 
fertilisation they intended to use a surrogate, then the surrogate mother would 
seemingly be the owner of the embryo. While the RRAFP provide for how 
ownership in relation to reproductive material operates in some instances, the 
ownership regime prescribed in the RRAFP has been described as being 
“incomplete” for failing to address important questions relating to PR, including 
what becomes of reproductive material when the person who owns it dies.279 
As such, it is necessary to investigate further the nature of ownership rights 
                                                      
 
278 Regulations Relating to Artificial Fertilisation of Persons regulation 18(2). 
279 A Martin ‘Embryo and Gamete Disposition – Who Owns My Embryos and Gametes and 
What Happens to Them Should Something Happen to Me?’ 17 February 2018. Available at 
https://ifaasa.co.za/newsletter/embryo-and-gamete-disposition-who-owns-my-embryos-and-g
ametes-and-what-happens-to-them-should-something-happen-t0-me (accessed on 17 August 
2018) 
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and how they ought to apply to reproductive material within the limitations 
placed on that ownership within the extant law.  
 
4.7 What it Means to Own Reproductive Material 
The fact that reproductive material is regarded as owned, implies that gametes 
and embryos are property. The ownership envisioned in the RRAFP is, 
however, significantly restricted. Ownership is defined as the most complete 
real right, and it gives the owner the most complete and absolute entitlements 
toward a thing.280 This liberty is protected in section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
which provides that “No one may be deprived of property except in terms of 
law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property.” As such, persons who own property are generally free to use it as 
they wish, free of state interference, except where this is a well justified. This 
level of freedom does not however appear to exist in relation to the authority 
an individual has over their reproductive material. In terms of the NHA, the use 
of gametes is limited to it being for “only for such medical or dental purposes 
as may be prescribed” in section 56(1).281  
In discussing the scope of section 56(1) in controlling the use of reproductive 
material, Jordaan points out that the common law rules for statutory 
interpretation require that the most beneficial interpretation of a law be 
preferred, and a restrictive interpretation of this section is beneficial as the 
court has stated that legislative provisions that are ambiguous should be given 
a meaning that least interferes with individual liberty.282 This is reinforced by 
the fact that to interpret it otherwise creates the potential that it may infringe on 
                                                      
 
280 S Mahomed, M Nöthling-Slabbert, MS Pepper ‘The Legal Position on the Classification of 
Human Tissue in South Africa: Can Tissues Be Owned?’ (2013) 6(1) SAJBL 4. 
281 National Health Act section 56(1). 
282 DW Jordaan ‘The Boy and His Microscope: Interpreting Section 56(1) of the National 
Health Act’ (2009) 2(1) SAJBL 14. In supporting this point, Jordaan refers to Rossouw v. 
Sachs 1964 2 SA 551 (A) where the court stated at 562D “If a statute is couched in ambiguous 
language, the court will give it the meaning which least interferes with the liberty of the 
individual”. This principle was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Moodley v Umzinto 
North Town Board 1998 (2) SA 188 (SCA) at 194D.  
65 
 
constitutionally protected rights such as privacy in an unjustified manner.283 
Respect for constitutionally protected rights mandates that where ambiguity in 
a statute exists, if that provision is capable of being interpreted in a way that 
does not infringe on liberty, such an interpretation is to be preferred.  
Ownership grants the legal subject certain entitlements in relation to a thing, 
including the freedom to control, use, encumber, alienate, transfer and 
vindicate their property. 284  In light of the various rights contained in 
procreative liberty at stake, I submit that section 56(1), and any other provision 
in the NHA and its regulations, should not be interpreted as limiting ownership 
rights in reproductive material – unless such an outcome is clearly and 
explicitly the intention of the legislature. Since the use of reproductive material 
for reproductive purposes is clearly limited, in order to ascertain to what extent 
– if any – this may be done posthumously, I will now look to how the law 
generally controls how a person may choose to control what happens to his 
body and property after death.  
 
4.8 Honouring the Wishes of the Deceased 
South African law gives recognition to the wishes of the deceased by giving 
effect to the right to freedom of testation, as long as the provisions of a 
person’s will are not, inter alia, contra bonos mores – i.e. against good 
morals.285 This stems from common law jurisprudence. Common law writers 
were unanimous in supporting giving legal recognition to the deceased’s 
wishes as expressed in a will.286 The current governing statute on wills is the 
Wills Act,287 which reflects the high premium that South African law places on 
                                                      
 
283 Jordaan op cit note 282 at 15. 
284 Mahomed et al op cit note 280 at 5. 
285 Slabbert op cit note 252 at 232. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Act 7 of 1953. 
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freedom of testation.288 While there are strict criteria on how one makes a will, 
“its contents are left mainly to the discretion of the individual testator”.289 De 
Waal and Schoeman-Malan argue that section 25(1) of the Constitution 
guarantees and supports freedom of testation, 290 and this approach was 
accepted in Minister of Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd.291 If freedom of testation 
applies to reproductive material, this would be a strong basis for arguing in 
favour of the honouring a deceased person’s request for PR.  
Under section 62 of the NHA, one who is competent to make a will is 
empowered to donate his or her body and tissue through his or her will.292 
This can also be done through a written, signed and witnessed document or an 
oral statement made in the presence of witnesses.293 In terms of the NHA, 
one can donate bodies, tissues, blood, blood products or gametes – but only to 
prescribed institutions or persons and only for the purposes prescribed in the 
NHA.294 These include: the training of students in the health sciences, health 
research, the advancement of health sciences or therapeutic purposes 
including use in a living person or the production of a therapeutic, diagnostic or 
prophylactic substance.295 This implies that after death, the human body and 
its components are property and can be treated in much the same way as 
other property. However, there are some limitations to this and one’s freedom 
of testation is limited only to circumstances where the body will be used in a 
manner that is beneficial to society. This affirms the existence of a “special 
                                                      
 
288 MJ De Waal and MC Schoeman-Malan Law of Succession 4 ed (2008) 4. 
289 De Waal and Schoeman-Malan op cit note 288 at 4. 
290 De Waal and Schoeman-Malan op cit note 288 at 5. 
291 2006 (4) SA 205 (c) para 18 as cited in De Waal and Schoeman-Malan op cit note 288 at 5. 
292 National Health Act section 62(1)(a) provides “A person who is competent to make a will 
may – 
(i) in the will; …donate his or her body or any specified tissue thereof to be used after his or her 
death”. 
293 National Health Act section 62(1)(a)(ii) and (iii). 
294 National Health Act section 63. 
295 National Health Act section 64(1). 
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status” of property rights in dead bodies in South African law, similar to the 
English common law view which does not recognise property rights in dead 
bodies as property to be owned – but rather as property to be taken care of.296 
If reproductive material is to be regarded in the same way as the human body 
and its components, it follows that freedom of testation includes the right of an 
individual to provide for what happens to their reproductive material after death 
in their will. In this sense, section 25 of the Constitution would protect a 
person’s desire to reproduce posthumously. This could potentially be 
facilitated through section 62 posthumous donations, but this seemingly does 
not apply to gametes and embryos. This is because the section refers to the 
donation of one’s “body or any specified tissue”, and the definition of tissue in 
the NHA specifically excludes gametes.297 One could, however, argue that the 
provision indirectly does allow for the removal of gametes after death. It stands 
to reason that if you can donate your whole body under section 62, this would 
include the donation of your gametes as they are still part of your body at death. 
The authorised institution or person to whom you donated your body would 
arguably be entitled to extract your gametes for the purpose of them being 
used in a living person in terms of section 64(1)(d), in order to facilitate artificial 
fertilisation. While such an interpretation would allow for the application of this 
provision to PR, it does seem at odds with the purpose of the provision. As it 
stands, it would appear that it was specifically intended that section 62 of the 
NHA does not apply to the donation of reproductive material after one dies.  
This is, however, not fatal to the argument that reproductive material may be 
donated after death in one’s will. While section 62 is apparently based on the 
application of the right of freedom of testation to the body and some of its 
components, it is not exhaustive of this right. Put differently, section 62 is 
simply a mechanism put in place to regulate only the donation of the body and 
specified tissue thereof and therefore not reproductive material, but one still 
                                                      
 
296 Slabbert op cit note 252 at 232. 
297 In terms of section 1 of the National Health Act tissue means human tissue, and includes 
flesh, bone, a gland, an organ, skin, bone marrow or body fluid, but excludes blood or a 
gamete. 
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has a right of freedom of testation over reproductive material which may be 
exercised through the ordinary mechanisms of freedom of testation. This is 
based on a restrictive interpretation of the scope of section 62, which gives 
expression to the principle established in the preceding section that legislative 
provisions are not to be interpreted as interfering with ownership rights in 
relation to reproductive material – unless it is clear the legislature intended to 
do so. It is submitted that the exclusion of reproductive material from the 
mechanisms of posthumous donation in section 62, is not such a clear 
indication of a desire to exclude reproductive material from being donated 
posthumously 
Beyond testamentary provisions relating to property, there are also specific 
provisions in the law that allow for one to dictate what happens to one’s body 
after death. The Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological 
Material298 provide for the removal of human tissue from deceased persons, 
but prescribes that this must be done with the consent of the deceased.299 If 
the deceased did not give consent, removal may still be done, but consent 
must be obtained from a member of the deceased’s family – with the caveat 
that this can only occur “where there is no evidence that the removal of the 
tissue or cells would be contrary to a direction given by the deceased before 
his or her death”.300 These regulations give effect to section 62 (ii) and (iii) of 
the NHA alluded to above – the other methods besides wills through which an 
individual can donate their bodies and specified tissues thereof. Substantially 
the same requirements relating to obtaining consent for use of a corpse apply 
                                                      
 
298 GN 177 of GG 35099, 2/3/2012. 
299 Regulations Relating to the Use of Human Biological Material regulation 3(1), read with 
regulation 4(1). 
300 These regulations, as with the NHA, impose a hierarchy of persons who may give consent 
on behalf of the deceased. At the top of the hierarchy is the deceased’s spouse or partner, 
followed by their major child, parent, guardian, major brother or major sister in that order. The 
implications of this hierarchical structure is that giving consent is not a communal decision, but 
rather all power to give or withhold consent is given to the person to whom making that 
decision vests. As such, if an individual higher up on the hierarchy gives consent, those below 
them cannot object and vice versa. 
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to post-mortem examinations.301 In all cases, where there is no consent or a 
contrary directive and all reasonable steps have been taken to contact 
surviving family members, application may be made to the Director General to 
authorise use of that body or authorise removal of body tissue. With specific 
reference to tissue, the Regulations Regarding the General Control of Human 
Bodies, Tissue, Blood, Blood Products and Gametes,302 provide that after 
death, the donee may collect the tissue that has been donated to them within 
24 hours – failing which the family is entitled to claim the body for burial.303 
Certain common factors can be identified in all these cases. First, the role of 
the deceased’s consent is central to all uses of his or her corpse or the parts 
thereof. It is only if no particular preference has been expressed that the law 
then looks to surviving family – and eventually to the Director General if no 
family can be located. Proponents of posthumous rights would argue that this 
is an instance of South African law giving recognition to the surviving rights of 
autonomy and dignity of the deceased. This, however, is countered by the fact 
that the posthumous use of bodies or their parts is restricted to instances 
where there is some clear benefit to society, whether it be to allow a dying 
person to save another person’s life with their organs, to facilitate the 
advancement of scientific research, or to promote medical education. This 
would indicate that the focal point is not the ongoing right to autonomy of the 
deceased, but rather the facilitation of a process by which the living can benefit 
from the dead – an approach that is in line with social utility. The central focus 
on social utility in relation to respect of the deceased’s wishes in our law, can 
better be observed when one assesses how the law as a whole regards 
corpses, and how legal rules relating to the dead are primarily concerned with 
the conduct of the living.  
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302 GN 180 of GG 35099, 2/3/2012. 
303 Regulations 8(1) and 8(2). The regulations are unclear on whether, if the body is unclaimed 
by this point whether a donee is still entitled to remove tissue donated to them. I submit this is 
permissible, as it seems the point of this provision was to prevent families from being 
unreasonably delayed in burying the deceased because the donee delays in removing the 
tissue donated to them. 
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4.9 The ‘Rights’ of the Dead in South African Law 
South African law grants certain legal protections to deceased bodies through 
various means – including the common law crimes of violation of a dead body 
and violation of a grave.304 The former is of direct relevance to PR, specifically 
PGR, which has been criticised as being contrary to the respectful treatment of 
a deceased person’s body.305 The crime of violating a corpse is defined as the 
unlawful and intentional violation of a dead human body, but what constitutes a 
violation has historically not been well defined by authorities.306 Dutch legal 
writers describe the violation of a corpse as entailing some interference with or 
indignity towards a dead body, and from the case law it is apparent that 
“violation” includes the cutting or otherwise dismembering of a corpse, as well 
as using a corpse for any acts that can be seen as indecent.307 
The crime of violating a corpse was recognised as part of modern South 
African law in 1993, in S v Coetzee308 – but dates as far back as 1918 with the 
case of R v Kunene and Mazibuko,309 where the accused was convicted of 
violating a dead body by removing part of a corpse for use in medicine.310 The 
criminalisation of this act has been justified broadly on the basis of there being 
some societal benefit in treating dead bodies with respect.311 Christison and 
                                                      
 
304 A Christinson, S Hoctor ‘Criminalisation of the Violation of a Grave and the Violation of a 
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311 The public interest dimension of the crime of violating a corpse is mentioned in the Digest 
by the jurist Macer, as quoted in Christinson and Hocter op cit note 304 at 27, where he states, 
“The offence of violating a tomb can be said to come under the lex Julia de vi publica (law 
against public disorder)”. This sentiment is echoed by Milton in ‘South African Criminal Law 
and Procedure’ (1982) 2 ed 283 also quoted in Christinson and Hoctor who remarks that, “The 
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Hoctor submit that the basis of these crimes is not the rights of the dead per se, 
but rather support the view that, “the protected interest is the deep respect and 
value accorded to a person’s life that survives beyond their death”. 312 
According to these authors, since the promulgation of the Constitution, implicit 
in the boni mores of society is the recognition that respect for the rights 
associated with individual autonomy survive death, particularly the rights to 
dignity and bodily integrity. In regard to the issue of dignity, the authors remark 
that:  
“Although a corpse has no legal personality in our law, to contend that protection 
of a person’s dignity is extinguished by the mere fact of death is to diminish the 
content of the right, and to undermine the normative framework embodied in the 
Constitution. Although the dead are incapable of enforcing their right to dignity 
(and in a technical legal sense, of possessing it), it is submitted that society as a 
whole has an interest in the preservation of dead persons’ dignity and the State a 
role as custodian of this right. Criminalising the act of violation of a corpse (or a 
grave, for that matter) can thus be justified on the basis of this need to recognise 
the possibility of injury to a deceased person’s dignity.”313 
While I agree with Christinson and Hoctor’s remarks relating to the reasoning 
behind laws protecting deceased bodies, it seems that the authors are 
inconsistent in their application of the understanding that the rights of the living 
are what are protected by these laws, and not the rights of the deceased. The 
fact that the deceased have no right to dignity was established in Spendiff v 
East London Daily Dispatch, Ltd314 in which the court made it clear that no 
action exists on the basis of an injuria to the dignity of a deceased person 
under South African law, and found that any action for slanderous comments 
                                                                                                                                                           
 
sanctity of human life and the respect for the dignity and integrity of the person compound to 
create a sense of respect for the bodily remains of dead persons”.  
312 Christinson and Hoctor op cit note 304 at 34. This argument is based on the one 
progressed by a German writer, commenting on a similar law in that country, see 
Labuschagne 1991 De Jure 147-148: “Die beskermde regsgoed is die algemene 
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314 1929 EDL 113. 
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against a dead person brought by a surviving family member would have to be 
based on the impugned comments having some measurable impact on them 
rather than the rights of the deceased.315  
The Spendiff case arose from an action brought against the Daily Dispatch 
newspaper, because it published an article in which a certain deceased person 
was referred to as a convicted murderer who had been executed for crimes he 
had committed.316 In truth, the deceased had been killed during violent strike 
action, and the article itself was a criticism of the fact that the labour party that 
had been protesting was now to pay money into a fund, through a compulsory 
levy on its members, for a “murderer's dependents”.317 The deceased’s widow 
and children brought claims against the newspaper, claiming, inter alia, that 
the contents of the article not only defamed them, but that the words published 
about the deceased falsely and maliciously alleged that he had been convicted 
of murder and executed, and so his family had suffered injury to their honour, 
dignity and reputation by their publication.318 In essence, the deceased’s 
widow and children sought to claim damages on the basis that these 
comments infringed the dignity of the deceased. However, as the deceased 
could not bring an action personally, they sought to bring a claim on the 
grounds that because of their close relationship with the deceased, the 
defamatory statements against him were a defamation to them. The Daily 
Dispatch took exception to the declarations by the widow and children, mainly 
on the basis that, in relation to the comments regarding the deceased, no 
cause of action had been disclosed, since it was not them the comments made 
reference to, and further that the words used in their ordinary meaning were 
not defamatory.319  
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In arguing that the comments made about the deceased were injurious to them, 
counsel for the deceased’s widow and children placed reliance on certain 
passages relating to posthumous legal injuries by the Roman-Dutch jurist Voet, 
referred to in the textbook Institute of Cape Law, in which it was stated: 
“According to Voet, an action will even lie for injuries done to a deceased person, 
as where his corpse is wrongfully detained, or his funeral interrupted, or his grave 
desecrated, or where a libel is published of the deceased after his death, such 
action to be instituted by the executor or children, or heir, of the deceased. In the 
case of a posthumous libel, the children will be entitled to sue for the injury done 
to themselves through such libel”.320 
These claims by Voet would indicate that under Roman-Dutch law, it was 
possible to cause legal injuries to the dead – implying that they had some 
posthumous interests, and thus undignified acts to corpses or graves were an 
injury to the deceased person who somehow retained some measure of legal 
personality. And it was the executor of his estate, his children or heirs who 
could sue for these injuries, and in the particular case of defamatory 
statements regarding deceased persons, that person’s children could also 
bring a claim for the injury to their own personality rights which occurred as a 
consequence of their father or mother being libelled. Again, the implication 
here is that it is possible to defame a deceased person, because the deceased 
retains some interest in his reputation. Voet also makes similar comments to 
the effect that wives may have a claim for defamation for spurious publications 
made about their deceased husbands. This is in as far as such publications 
also make reference to the wife or their marriage relationship, differentiating 
this from the rule established in precedent that a widow had no cause of action 
where persons had committed an injury against her husband after his death.321 
In his judgment, Van Der Riet J considered the comments by Voet in context 
and concluded that Voet’s comments were not a true reflection of the 
Roman-Dutch law position. In relation to the claim of children for posthumous 
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libel, the court noted that there is little in the authorities to support the 
contentions by Voet and that there were in fact authorities directly disputing the 
existence of any such claim by the child.322 What was held to have been clear, 
was that the heir would have a right of action for defamatory statements 
against the deceased which affected the estate in a material or pecuniary 
manner.323 Similarly, in relation to the claim of the deceased’s widow, Van Der 
Riet J found Voet’s comments as extending to the widow a right not afforded to 
her under Roman-Dutch law.324  
In relation to the application of these contentions to South African law, Van Der 
Riet J held that there is no record of any reported cases in the superior courts 
of actions brought by children for defamatory statements about their deceased 
fathers.325 In making its judgment, the court considered how the Roman-Dutch 
law had been interpreted in other jurisdictions – referring extensively to the 
Scottish case of Broom v Richie & Co.326 In discussing this judgment, the 
judge expressed agreement with the comments of Lord Justice Clerk, which he 
summarised as follows:  
“Lord Justice CLERK held while no action lay where the reputation of the 
deceased only was affected and solatium to the living is the only question, for that 
would be giving a third party the right to recover damages as for a wrong done to 
the deceased, an action did lie in regard to the statements concerning a 
deceased person from which it is a necessary implication that others are directly 
injured as for wrong although indirectly done through aspersion of the 
deceased.”327 [own underlining] 
What these comments illustrate, is that under Roman-Dutch law, the true 
position was that there was no action arising out of comments made about 
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deceased persons, and the dead could not – in the legal sense – be defamed 
as they had no dignity and to allow any such claim by executors, heirs, wives 
or children, would be to allow them to claim for wrongs done to the deceased, 
which was impermissible. The only claim that could arise out of libellous 
remarks about deceased persons would be in circumstances where living 
relatives were also directly implicated by these statements. It is thus apparent 
that this rule was not a recognition of an interest of the deceased in their 
reputation, but rather it was an instance of a protection of a living person’s 
personality rights, by not allowing defamatory statements about that person 
cloaked in references to the dead in order to escape legal action. As such, Van 
Der Riet J concludes that the correct position in our law is that, 
“the wife and sons of a deceased party who has been slanderously aspersed, 
have a right of action only if the nature of the aspersion be such that they 
themselves are directly affected in status or patrimonial interest, and that I should 
not hold that mere hurt to their feelings of regard for the deceased man should 
entitle them to such an action”.328 
Per the Spendiff judgment, it is the position in South African law that the dead 
have no personality rights, from which it follows that they cannot be 
posthumously defamed. Nor is the protection of the deceased’s corpse or 
grave in any way a recognition of rights in bodily integrity or dignity held by the 
deceased person. In each case where their exists laws relating to the affairs of 
people after death, these rules might seem to be based on respect for the 
dignity or other rights of the deceased – but on a closer analysis, this is not the 
case, and rather they are concerned with the interests of the living.329 What is 
apparent from this, is that rights are bound to human personhood in South 
Africa, which is conditioned upon life. The laws relating to the respectful 
                                                      
 
328 Spendiff supra 129. 
329 Another instance of this can be seen in the case of O’Keeffe v Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 254 (C) in relation to the right to privacy. In this case, it was 
held that while disclosing private information about a now deceased person may be unlawful, it 
is not an invasion of the right to privacy and surviving family may not bring such a claim on 
behalf of the deceased. They are however permitted to bring a claim in their own capacity if the 
unlawful disclosure of the deceased’s information breaches their own right to privacy.  
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treatment of graves and dead bodies are not to be construed as giving to the 
dead the rights of the living, and such rules are better understood through the 
paradigm of social utility. While the deceased themselves no longer have 
rights, rules protecting the deceased exist to protect society’s interest in the 
respectful treatment of the dead. 
 
4.10 Procreative Liberty as a Basis for Posthumous Reproduction in 
South Africa 
The fact that the deceased do not retain rights posthumously does not mean 
that no rights can be said to apply to and protect an individual’s capacity to 
choose to allow their reproductive material to be used after death. In this, the 
final section of this chapter, I will attempt to formulate an argument in favour of 
a right to PR, founded upon the individual procreative liberty possessed by the 
living, which provides a basis for permitting PR after death. 
The crux of the argument is this: While alive, a legal subject is vested with the 
rights to, in terms of section 12(2)(a), make reproductive choices, and one 
such choice a person is empowered to make is the choice to participate in PR. 
This is based on the wide range of choices protected by reproductive 
autonomy, although the extent of this is yet to be explored in the South African 
context. International legal instruments make clear that there is more to this 
right than simply allowing an individual the freedom to choose to engage in 
reproductive activity. This is evident when one considers South Africa’s own 
international commitments, such as The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW was adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly and entered into force as an 
international treaty on the 3rd of September 1981, and which South Africa – as 
a member of the United Nations – ratified on 15th December 1995.330 While 
the focus of this instrument was, as the name indicates, eliminating 
                                                      
 
330 Available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lan
g=en (accessed 25 October 2018). 
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discrimination against women, CEDAW also sheds light on the scope of 
reproductive choices a person is entitled to in article 16:  
“1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in 
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women: … 
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing 
of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to 
enable them to exercise these rights” (own underlining) 
What can be taken from CEDAW, is that section 12(2)(a), read together with 
article 16, protects not only an individual’s right to choose whether or not to 
have children, but also how many children to have, and when to have them. 
Moreover, this places a positive duty on the state to take measures to ensure 
that individuals have all the means they require to exercise these choices, 
which goes beyond just medical technologies – but also includes information 
and education. This is reinforced at a regional level by the Protocol to The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on The Rights of Women in 
Africa (the Protocol), at article 14, which states:  
“1. States Parties shall ensure that the right to health of women, including sexual 
and reproductive health is respected and promoted. This includes: 
a) the right to control their fertility; 
b) the right to decide whether to have children, the number of children and the 
spacing of children; 
c) the right to choose any method of contraception; 
d) the right to self-protection and to be protected against sexually transmitted 
infections, including HIV/AIDS; 
e) the right to be informed on one's health status and on the health status of one's 
partner, particularly if affected with sexually transmitted infections, including 
HIV/AIDS, in accordance with internationally recognized standards and best 
practices; 
g) the right to have family planning education. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to: 
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a) provide adequate, affordable and accessible health services, including 
information, education and communication programmes to women especially 
those in rural areas.” 
What one can draw from this is, firstly, that access to reproductive choices is 
essentially underpinned by the right to have access to medical and other 
resources to facilitate making reproductive choices. This undoubtedly would 
include access to medical technology in the case of MAR, where medical 
technology is essential to exercising reproductive choices. Not only is the 
government duty bound to make access to MAR technology possible, they are 
further obligated by the Protocol to take measures to ensure access to MAR, 
particularly for women. As such, it is submitted that the freedom to make 
reproductive choices, as protected in section 12, includes the right to access to 
MAR technologies. PR is an instance of MAR, and, as such, if MAR is 
regarded as a right, this would indicate that one has a right to make 
reproductive choices in the use of one’s gametes or an embryo one 
contributed a gamete to after he or she dies. One could even argue that PR is 
included in the terms of the right to choose when to have children referred to in 
both CEDAW and the Protocol.  
This has application to both the deceased and surviving partner – the 
deceased while alive has the right to make the choice to choose to participate 
in PR, and the surviving spouse has the right to choose to undergo PR with the 
reproductive material of the deceased. This interpretation of procreative 
autonomy provides a strong reason in law, based on fundamental rights, to 
give effect to an expressed desire to participate in PR. As such, if a court were 
to be faced with a situation where a partner makes a request to use a 
deceased person’s reproductive material, if there is some indication that the 
deceased was willing to allow for their reproductive material to be used for 
posthumous reproduction, the court ought to grant such a request.  
It must be emphasised, however, that the argument here is not that the right to 
make reproductive choices continues to exist after death. As I have indicated 
in the preceding discussion, I believe that the law does not recognise 
posthumous rights. Rather this argument is in the same vein as the one 
advanced by counsel for NC in Aevitas, that living persons have a right to 
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determine the fate of their reproductive material should they die. 331 The 
distinction between these two conceptions, while seemingly nuanced, is 
fundamentally important. 
On the one hand, if we say that even after death one has rights to things such 
as dignity and reproductive autonomy, this statement conflicts with the most 
fundamental aspects of our understandings of rights, and we encounter 
challenges such as having to account for how the deceased is harmed if these 
rights are not given effect to, why the deceased have some rights and not 
others, why we ought to give effect to these particular rights, and in what sense 
deceased persons are legal subjects. On the other hand, if we say the living 
have a right to make reproductive choices, including what happens to their 
gametes after they die, none of these challenges arise. In this case, we 
recognise the living person as a having a right, and if that right were to be 
limited by legislation during his or her lifetime, it would have to be reasonable 
and justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. If, however, the 
deceased’s choice to participate in or abstain from PR is expressed to those 
who survive him or her, and was not adhered to after death, this would not be a 
violation of the deceased’s right (as he no longer has any) – but would 
arguably be contrary to the respectful treatment of deceased persons, and 
ergo contrary to public policy and potentially unlawful.332 
If we take it to be true that a right to the choice to reproduce posthumously 
exists, whether or not the deceased’s wishes are to be respected would have 
to find support in social utility, as the concept within which South African law 
provides for legal rules relating to the dead. In the South African context, what 
this means is that the various PR practices must be beneficial to the living and 
should also not amount to undignified treatment of the dead. The benefit to the 
living of PR is self-evident, and the reason surviving spouses such as Mrs 
                                                      
 
331 Aevitas: Applicants Heads of Argument para 15 
332 CE Pienaar ‘Is it Unlawful to Treat the Dead Without Respect and Dignity?’ (2018) 22(1) 
Prof Nurs Today 50. Pienaar argues that where corpses are treated in contravention of 
applicable legislation, such as the rules relating to the transportation of deceased persons in 
the NHA, the deceased’s family and members of the public would be able to bring civil claims 
for emotional harm suffered by them as a result of this unlawful act.   
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Blood333 or NC334 make a request to use the reproductive material of their 
deceased spouse and willingly undergo litigation (which in Blood’s case was 
quite lengthy) – is because it was important to them to be able to have a child 
genetically related to their deceased partner. Kruuse, in discussing the value of 
procreation in the context of PR, highlights that this extends beyond just 
respect for the autonomy of the deceased.335 Procreation also possesses 
value for the living that is worthy of protection because of the relations it 
creates,336 and the value in the act of defining one’s self and life narrative.337 
The significance of the latter reason in creating a genetic link to future 
generations, is discussed as resonating with the traditional Zulu custom of 
ukungena, where a surviving male relative of a married man has children with 
the widow of the deceased, and these children are regarded as the children of 
the deceased.338 The value in this practice is that a man, while alive, has a 
certain sense of security in knowing that even if he dies before he is able to 
have children, this is not necessarily the end of his life narrative as long as he 
has brothers and has taken a wife, because through ukungena he may 
become a father even after he dies. Fatherhood is something that Zulu men 
regard as highly significant in terms of their social standing and which has a 
meaningful impact on their legacy. PR has a similar value to all who wish to 
make use of it. 
Procreative liberty provides a clear justification for the courts to give effect to 
requests by surviving partners, where there is evidence of the deceased 
partner’s desire to make their reproductive material available to the surviving 
spouse – as the court did in Aevitas. It is my view that granting such a request 
is the correct approach, because it gives effect to procreative liberty, is 
                                                      
 
333 See discussion of Blood in Chapter 2. 
334 See discussion of Aevitas in Chapter 3.  
335 Kruuse op cit note 8 at 545. 
336 Kruuse op cit note 8 at 546. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid. 
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respectful to the deceased’s wishes, and serves socially important goals in 
procreation for both the deceased partner and the surviving partner.  
 
4.11 Conclusion 
In discussing the controversial ‘Body World’ exhibits, in which human corpses 
are presented as pieces of art, Young points out that one of the main reasons 
people object to such a display is that some regard it as an undignified use and 
portrayal of the human body – especially because it is done for profit.339 
Treating the body of the deceased, their wishes and even their legacy with 
respect, is clearly something many people regard as being important. So much 
so, that legal rules have developed around the respectful treatment of the dead. 
However, these rules which exist for the sake of the living should not be 
confused as granting legal recognition to deceased persons. The dead have 
no right to dignity; instead the law prescribes that the dead must be treated in a 
dignified manner, because of the social utility in doing so. The dignified 
treatment of the dead in South Africa includes giving respect to the wishes of 
the dead regarding what happens to their property and their bodies after they 
die.  
It is submitted that PR in no way offends the principle of the respectful 
treatment of the dead, as it is apparent with the various forms of posthumous 
donation of tissue made possible in the NHA and its regulations, that the 
posthumous use of tissue is permissible. Even with PGR, the medical 
operation associated with this practice requires significantly less interference 
with the corpse than autopsies, and yet these are permissible in certain 
circumstances. In light of this, I cannot see how PGR could be regarded as the 
mutilation or otherwise improper use of a corpse.  
It has been shown that there is no current legal barrier to PR. A proper 
interpretation of the relevant provisions that might be seen to prohibit PR 
rather show that the extant law simply does not address PR, and the 
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disposition of reproductive material after death was clearly not contemplated. 
PR is, however, permissible because individuals enjoy freedom of testation in 
relation to their reproductive material, and further there is an argument in 
support of individuals having a right to reproduce posthumously protected by 
the Bill of Rights. 
This chapter discussed the application of human rights to PR, but there 
remains one more major human rights issue to be considered in relation to PR, 
and that is whether PR, in its use of reproductive material, somehow 
negatively impacts the rights of the child. 
  
83 
 
5. CHAPTER FIVE: POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS TO POSTHUMOUS 
REPRODUCTION 
 
Having established that PR is permissible in South African law and that 
individuals have a right to reproduce posthumously, I now consider whether 
there are any justified reasons that our law ought to prohibit PR or otherwise 
place restrictions on it – as other states discussed in Chapter 2 have. Because 
the choice to reproduce posthumously is an instance of one’s constitutionally 
protected procreative liberty, any limitation in the exercise of this choice would 
be unconstitutional, unless it can be shown that, “the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom” – taking into account the nature of the right, the 
importance of the nature of the limitation, the limitation’s nature and extent, 
whether there is a relation between the limitation and its importance, and 
whether there are means less restrictive than the limitation in question that can 
achieve the intended purpose.340 In this chapter, I attempt to identify any such 
limitation by looking at the common objections to PR that underlie the various 
limitations to the practice, and critically analyse the validity of these objections 
by investigating whether there is any credible evidence to support them.  
 
5.1 But What About the Children? Procreative Liberty and the Child’s 
Best Interests 
In the area of MAR, the most common justification given in support of limiting 
reproductive rights, are the interests of the resultant children. South Africa is 
no exception; the application of section 28 of the Constitution which provides 
that “[a] child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter 
concerning the child” has proven to be central to the determination of South 
African cases concerning reproductive choices. What is actually in the child’s 
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best interests is, however, a contentions point, and the meaning of this phrase 
in our law has not been determined with any certainty.341  
The principle of the best interests of the child (BIOC) as being paramount first 
emerged in South Africa in the common law and was applied by the courts 
when determining familial disputes over custody and access to children.342 
The court would determine what was in the child’s best interests by engaging 
in an enquiry as to which parent would be better able to ensure and promote 
the child’s wellbeing holistically, taking into account a variety of 
considerations.343 Since then, the scope of this principle has been expanded  
and, consequently, its application has become more complex, under the 
influence of growing international emphasis on protecting the interests of 
children as a vulnerable group through provisions committing states to make 
the welfare of children paramount.344 This led to the inclusion of the principle 
of the BIOC in our Bill of Rights in a form very similar to those seen in 
prominent international instruments.345  
What it is important to consider for the purposes of this chapter is not so much 
the direct application of the BIOC, but rather the extent to which limitations to 
procreative liberty by the state are permissible under the justification that doing 
so is in the child’s best interests. In doing so, we return once again to the case 
of AB v Minister of Social Development.346 One of the core issues in this case 
was the biological link requirement in section 294 of the Children’s Act, and 
                                                      
 
341 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 7 BCLR 713 (CC) para 
18. 
342 R Malherbe ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Best Interests of the Child as Applied in 
Education’ (2008) Journal of South African Law 267. 
343 Ibid.  
344 See, generally, TJ Walsh ‘Advancing the Interests of South Africa's Children: A Look at the 
Best Interests of Children Under South Africa's Children's Act’ (2011) 19 (2) Michigan State 
Journal of International Law 202-249. 
345 Walsh op cit note 5 at 344, notes that many of the provisions of The UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, which South Africa ratified shortly before the promulgation of the 
Constitution, appear in the text of the Constitution.  
346 For a discussion of the factual background and legal issues in AB see Chapter 3. 
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whether this limitation on who may access surrogacy was justified, in that it 
was rationally connected to a legitimate government purpose. What the 
purpose of section 294 was, however, was a contested point between the 
minority and majority. Nkabinde J endorsed the interpretation of section 294 as 
protecting the entitlement of children to know their genetic origin and found 
that this purpose was rationally connected to section 294.347 In reaching this 
conclusion, the judge held:  
“Is there a rational connection between the differentiation in question and the 
legitimate governmental purpose that differentiation is designed to achieve? YES: 
The requirement of donor gamete(s) within the context of surrogacy indeed 
serves a rational purpose – the public good chosen by the lawgiver – of creating a 
bond between the child and the commissioning parents or parent. The creation of 
a bond is designed to protect the best interests of the child-to-be born so that the 
child has a genetic link with its parent(s). Therefore, a rational connection 
exists”.348 [own underlining] 
Khampepe J pointed out that there is a contradiction in the Children’s Act 
between section 41, which protects the anonymity of general gamete donors, 
and the majority’s interpretation of section 294.349 The minority took the view 
that knowledge of genetic origin is a purely coincidental effect of section 294, 
rather than its purpose. Instead, it was stated that the purpose of section 294 
was to prevent the circumvention of the adoption process, and there was no 
evidence that this was an important purpose to be achieved, nor was there 
evidence that the provision results in the prevention of harm, making it in the 
best interests of the child. Instead what it does do, the minority held, is elevate 
the biological link requirement above court determination, ostensibly because 
it can never be in the child’s best interests to be born in such a scenario, and in 
doing so it contradicts the factors the Children’s Act mandates the court to 
consider in terms of section 7(1), whenever the best interests of the child are to 
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be considered.350 Because of this, Khampepe J states that the essential 
question is not whether there is a rational connection between section 294 and 
its purpose, but rather whether section 294 serves a purpose so fundamental 
as to outweigh and justify the limitation of AB’s rights. 351 Ultimately, the 
minority’s conclusion was that it was not, and it was stated that section 294 
was an extensive and unjustifiable intrusion into a central part of the lives of 
AB and all women who are both conception and pregnancy infertile.  
As is apparent from the above discussion, the rationality of the biological link 
requirement was key to the outcome of this judgment. Implicit in the statement 
by Nkabinde J quoted above, is the court’s acceptance that the creation of a 
biological link was a “public good”, and that that this provision promotes the 
best interests of the child. The court accepted this to be true, without any 
evidence, since it declined to take into account the extensive evidence before 
it that had been central to the High Court’s judgement,352 stating that: 
“The High Court’s approach, suggesting the need for credible data to 
demonstrate that the presence or absence of a genetic link in the context of 
surrogacy will have adverse effects on the child, is wrong. That approach 
elevates the importance of empirical research above the purposive construction 
of the challenged provision, to establish a legitimate governmental purpose. In 
                                                      
 
350 Section 7 of the Children’s Act provides that, “(1) Whenever a provision of this Act requires 
the best interests of the child standard to be applied, the following factors must be taken into 
consideration…” and then proceeds to list of 9 factors.  
351 AB supra para 213. 
352 See para 269 footnote 245, where the court states: “As in the High Court, the parties relied 
on the opinion by experts in support of their perspectives. I will not place reliance on the 
divergent opinions of the experts in deciding the issues because this Court, as the ultimate 
authority on the questions regarding the validity of legislation and violation of rights, should 
arrive at its own independent evaluation”. DW Thaldar ‘Post-Truth Jurisprudence: The Case of 
AB v Minister of Social Development’ (2018) SAJHR 19-20 points out that the courts 
statements here are unfounded firstly because it is untrue that both parties had relied on 
expert evidence before the Constitutional Court, only AB did. Secondly the evidence was in no 
way divergent and was in fact uncontroverted. And thirdly, the courts position as final arbiter 
does not entitle it to simply ignore evidence relevant to the determination of core issues in the 
case before it.  
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any case, courts do not rely on the opinions or ‘credible data’ by experts when 
determining the constitutionality of legislation.”353 
What the majority of the Constitutional Court was in effect saying, was that the 
expert evidence in this case, and all cases, was entirely irrelevant to the 
determination of the rationality of provisions in constitutional challenges. I 
suggest that such a view is incorrect and contrary to the spirit and purport of 
the Constitution – particularly section 36 which binds the power of the state to 
limit rights to instances where it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. My suggestion is based on the strength of the evidence 
provided by the experts for AB showing there was no factual basis for the 
assumption that children conceived through MAR are harmed by not having a 
genetic link to their parents. AB’s submissions included a total of 14 expert 
opinions, including 2 opinions from experts relating to the connection between 
the best interests of the child and the establishment of a genetic link.354 One of 
these opinions was by Susan Golombok, a leading international expert, which 
concluded, based on empirical research, that the “presence or absence of a 
genetic link between a parent and child in the context of surrogacy does not 
appear to have an effect on the child’s psychological well-being”.355 This was 
corroborated by another opinion by an experienced South African practitioner 
who said that even in the absence of a genetic link, the process of selecting a 
donor establishes a bond between the commissioning parent and the resultant 
child. 356  The High Court accepted and relied on this evidence, while 
dismissing the submissions by the state’s expert, because of well-founded 
criticism of the content and qualifications of the expert to make some of the 
averments – therein rendering them such that little or no reliance could be 
placed on them.357  
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Thaldar opines that had the Constitutional Court considered the expert 
evidence – as the High Court did – it would have concluded that no rational 
nexus existed between the legitimate government purpose of establishing a 
biological link between commissioning parents and surrogate children and 
section 294, and I concur.358 As Nkabinde J herself noted, “[r]ationality is an 
incident of the rule of law. When enacting laws, the Legislature is constrained 
to act rationally and not capriciously or arbitrarily”. A legislative provision based 
on a purpose for which there is not only no evidence, but a significant amount 
of credible evidence that refutes it, is the height of capriciousness and 
arbitrariness. In this regard, the court failed in its duty to guard against 
irrational derogation from the rights protected in the Bill of Rights. What this 
case illustrates, is the importance of considering credible data in protecting 
rationality and guarding against the arbitrary infringement of procreative liberty.  
 
5.2 Applying the Best Interests of the Child to Prospective Children 
What is clear from the Khampepe judgment and the Nkabinde judgment in AB 
considered together, is that, in principle, the BIOC standard can be used to 
limit an individual’s procreative liberty in the name of protecting future children. 
The judgments simply differed regarding what the content of the BIOC was in 
the context of the AB case. This highlights the concern that the application of 
the BIOC standard – which is supposed to protect the future child’s interests – 
is invoked and used to unduly limit the autonomy of individuals who choose 
MAR.  
The case of surrogacy serves to illustrate how section 28(3) of the Constitution 
is applied to MAR in determining the best interests of a resultant child. 
Surrogacy is dealt with in chapter 9 of the Children’s Act. In order for one to 
engage in MAR for the purposes of surrogacy, one must first enter into a 
surrogate motherhood agreement – the requirements for which are set out 
section 292(1) of the Children’s Act. The agreement must be confirmed by the 
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court through an ex parte application and thereafter insemination must take 
place within 18 months of confirmation of the agreement.359  
Confirmation of surrogate motherhood agreements is the duty of the High 
Court as the upper guardian of children.360 The criteria the court must take 
into account when determining whether to confirm a surrogacy agreement 
were set out in Ex parte WH,361 which was an application for the confirmation 
of a surrogate motherhood agreement in terms of section 295 of the Children’s 
Act by an all-male couple.362 
In its discussion of the BIOC, the court here stated that it is best that this 
principle be given application through a flexible enquiry, in terms of which 
“individual circumstances will determine the best interests of the child”.363 The 
flexible enquiry called for by Kollapen J and Tolmay J in their joint judgment, 
requires that judges approach each case with an open mind rather than apply 
a strict set of rules; however, the judges also caution against the use of this 
discretion held by judges as a means to impose their own personal views 
under the guise of sound legal principles. A similar concern was raised by the 
court in Fitzpatrick, where the court noted that the indeterminate nature of the 
BIOC has led to its application often devolving into a moral issue, and the 
perceived majority view of society is erroneously taken to be equal to the 
child’s best interests.364 In discussing the significance of surrogacy being 
accessible to same sex couples, the judges remarked on the need to avoid 
discriminatory practices by excluding from parenthood family forms that would 
deprive the child of one parent (i.e. a mother or a father).365 Commenting on 
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how same sex couples having children is commonly objected to because the 
child will not have a parent of a particular gender, the court stated: “Many 
children grow up without a father or mother and the court should safeguard 
that it does not try to create a utopia for children born from surrogacy that is far 
removed from the social reality of society.”366  
This remark elucidates a very important dimension that must be considered 
when determining the BIOC in MAR – this principle must not be applied in a 
way in which barriers to MAR exist for all, except those who will be capable of 
providing an idealistic environment for the resultant child. This is supported by 
the Constitutional Court’s statement in AD v DW that “[c]hild law is an area that 
abhors maximalist legal propositions that preclude or diminish the possibilities 
of looking at and evaluating the specific circumstances of the case”.367 
In considering what is in the best interests of a prospective child, one must be 
cognisant of the present realities of society and the ever-changing family form, 
so as not to unfairly limit the reproductive autonomy of those capable of 
providing what is likely to be a healthy upbringing – simply because it will be in 
circumstances other than the traditional nuclear family. The court expands on 
this in its discussion of the determination of a ‘suitable parent’ in terms of the 
Children’s Act. The court pointed out that as there are no restrictions to the 
ability to procreate for most people, setting unreasonably high standards that 
are not justifiable for those who choose surrogacy, would be a contravention of 
the spirit of equality enshrined in the Constitution.368 In this statement, the 
court makes clear that those who exercise their right to make the choice to 
reproduce are not to have their choices given lesser or greater respect 
because of how they choose to procreate; people who choose non-coital 
reproduction are entitled to have their procreative autonomy respected in the 
same way as those who reproduce coitally, and their exercise of these choices 
should not be interfered with without good justification. According to the 
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majority in AB, however, this is limited to circumstances where the MAR 
procedure in question involves one’s own body.  
The dangers of the arbitrary application of BIOC, is that, unchecked, it can be 
used as a basis for discriminatory policies, such as the exclusion of certain 
societal groups or the prohibition of legitimate medical treatments for 
infertility. 369  The effective application of the BIOC requires a thorough 
investigation of the relevant facts and evidence regarding the impact of a 
particular state action on child welfare. 
 
5.3 Objections to Posthumous Reproduction 
In Chapter 2, we saw that limitation to PR can include complete prohibitions, 
requirements of prior consent (in writing or otherwise), waiting periods, and 
time limits. Limitations to PR are all based, in the main, on the reasoning that 
one or all forms of PR are objectionable because they cause harm to the 
resultant child, as well as because of the impact on surviving spouses and 
family members, and, as such, it is in the best interests of the prospective child 
that PR be limited.370 The objections to PR can be broadly summed up in 
these four statements: 
1. PR is harmful to children because children are harmed by being born into 
a single parent household. 
2. PR is harmful to children because being deprived of knowing one’s 
parent is psychologically harmful to a child. 
3. PR is harmful to children because children are harmed by not being able 
to inherit from the deceased’s estate or collect survivor benefits. 
4. PR is potentially harmful to children if permitted shortly after the death of 
the deceased, because the surviving partner is not psychologically fit to 
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make a sound decision regarding having the child – because of the grief 
of losing their partner.  
Bahadur finds these contentions about the harm to children unconvincing and 
argues that the impact on children caused by PR should be minimal, and no 
greater than the impact on children in similar situations.371 I suggest that 
Bahadur is correct. There has been no empirical study documenting the 
impacts on children caused by PR. However, we can draw inferences on 
whether there is going to be any harm of a sufficient severity as to merit 
limitation of the parent’s procreative liberty caused by PR, by looking at the 
outcomes of children in situations similar to those that posthumous children will 
find themselves in. In the next section, I discuss each of the objections and 
how they relate to PR, describe how they are used to justify the various 
limitations on PR, and, where possible, show whether the apprehensions of 
harm to children are legitimate – by looking at empirical research on children in 
similar circumstances.  
 
Objection 1: Single Parent Households 
The first, and probably the main concern with PR raised by authors in this area, 
is that it involves knowingly and intentionally bringing the resultant child into a 
single parent household, which is often used to support PR being prohibited 
entirely or in support of any of the other limitations.372 This objection emerges 
from the fact that usually, as it was for NC in Aevitas, the surviving partner will 
request PR shortly after the death, with the intention of raising the resultant 
child on their own. It should be pointed out that this eventuality need not 
necessarily come to pass as surviving partners may enter into new 
relationships. However, for those who raise this objection, it seems to be 
assumed that children will be born into single parent households that will 
remain single parent households throughout the children’s lives. 
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This objection is founded on the assumption that single parent households are 
in some way inherently inferior to households with two parents, and, as such, 
the welfare of children in single parent homes is likely to be significantly lower 
than it would be in a two-parent household. On the face of it, this objection 
stands to be rejected for applying a clearly maximalist conception of the BIOC, 
as its proponents are effectively taking the view that two parent families are 
ideal for a child’s welfare, and therefore persons in family forms other than two 
parent families are to be denied their procreative liberties. Furthermore, on a 
deeper analysis, the assumption of the inherent superiority of two parent 
families for ensuring healthy child development, is unjustified and irrational.  
The view that single parent family forms are less than ideal is not entirely 
without basis. Based on empirical research, it has been established that 
children of single parent families do not fare as well generally as those from 
families with two parents – for instance, being a child of a single parent 
household has been shown to be associated with socio-economic 
disadvantage throughout life.373 This might lead one to conclude, as many do, 
that the experience of children in single parent households is somehow 
inherently deficient, but a close analysis of the reasons for the negative 
outcomes of children from single parent households paints a different picture. 
In a 25-year New Zealand longitudinal study of children on the impact of single 
parenthood on the later outcomes of children, associations were found 
between single parenthood and anxiety, poorer performance in higher 
education, challenges with financial independence, and criminal activity initially, 
but the researchers also found most of these outcomes could be explained by 
confounding factors. 374  This led the researches to conclude that these 
associations could be accounted for by taking into consideration the social and 
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contextual factors associated with single parenthood. 375  Some of these 
confounding factors include the generally lower maternal age of single parent 
mothers, lower levels of parental education, poorer socio-economic status, 
greater family conflict, exposure to childhood abuse by parents, involvement in 
criminal activity, and a generally lower IQ.376 Taking these disadvantages into 
account, the researchers ultimately concluded that exposure to single 
parenthood was largely unrelated to healthy adjustment in adulthood.  
The findings of the above study indicate that being born in a single parent 
household does not necessarily cause any kind of disadvantage to children, 
and rather single parenthood tends to occur in disadvantaged circumstances 
and these circumstances lead to negative outcomes in children. Similar 
conclusions have been reached by other researchers in this area. Studies 
attempting to explain why children from two parent families outperform in 
educational contexts those from single parent families, show that the former 
group benefits from the greater economic benefit of having two parents and 
are not exposed to the same disadvantages. 377  As stated by Susan 
Golombok: 
“… [I]t is not simply being raised by a single parent that leads to these outcomes. 
Children in single parent families are more likely to suffer economic hardship, and 
many will have been exposed to the conflict, distress and family disruption that is 
commonly associated with their parents’ separation or divorce … It is these 
factors that accompany single parenthood, rather than single parenthood itself, 
that are largely responsible for the disadvantages experienced by children in 
one-parent homes”.378 
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I suggest that this phenomenon is the reason for the apparent stigma 
concerning single parent households. The negative outcomes of children from 
single parent homes prima facie supports the idea that single parent 
households are always more dangerous to a child’s wellbeing. The reality, 
however, is that these negative outcomes are because children from single 
parent families tend to face greater challenges in life than those born of two 
parent households. In this case, it is instructive to bear in mind the oft repeated 
scientific principle: correlation does not imply causation.  
The case of posthumous children is in not comparable to children in single 
parent households where the one parent dies after the child is born as some 
have contended379 – because at no point do they experience the loss of a 
parent. There is thus no way in which the death of a parent could adversely 
affect them, as can be the case where the parent dies after the child’s birth. 
Nor are surviving partners prone to being exposed to the same 
socio-economic challenges arising from the surviving parent suddenly having 
to raise a child alone, parents of posthumous children will be willingly entering 
into single parenthood and will have time to ensure they can provide for a child 
and prepare themselves for it. As such, none of the sources of negative 
outcomes in children related to single parenthood appear to apply when we 
consider single parent households created as a result of PR.  
A fairer comparison can perhaps be made by comparing PR to the newly 
emerging family form described as “single mothers by choice” or “solo 
mothers”, which was the subject of a recent study by Golombok and her team 
at the University of Cambridge.380 Solo mothers are, “single heterosexual 
women who have chosen to parent alone and have had children through donor 
insemination”.381  
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In this study, many of the hardships ordinarily related to negative outcomes for 
children of single parent homes, were not a factor as these women were single 
since the child’s conception, and, as such, the resultant child was not exposed 
to any traumatic experiences related to separation and divorce. Furthermore, 
solo mothers are primarily older professionals who can afford the financial cost 
of raising a child, and, as such, the children were not disadvantaged by a lack 
of economic resources. 382  The research on solo mothers has found no 
differences in parenting quality when compared to two parent homes.383 Quite 
to the contrary of what proponents of limiting PR because of the danger of 
harm caused to resultant children might assume to be true – there is evidence 
that solo parents have better relationships with their children, as this group 
recorded fewer instances of mother–child conflict.384 The study by Golombok 
et al could find no evidence of any differences in child adjustment.385  
These conclusions expose the assumptions underlying this objection as being 
baseless. When it comes to ensuring the healthy development of a child it 
seems two is not better than one, the welfare of children in single parent 
households is by no means necessarily lower than the perceived ideal of a 
two-parent household. In fact this family form may even be superior. In the 
absence of any evidence to show that single parent households in some other 
way endanger child welfare, any limitations based on this objection are not a 
justified limitation on the right to reproduce posthumously.  
 
Objection 2: Psychological Harm to Child 
This objection is based on several claims regarding the psychological impact 
of PR on resultant children. One of the hallmarks of a restrictive regime in 
regulating PR, which either outlaws the practice or places significant limitations 
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on it, is apprehension about the welfare of any resultant children who will be 
denied the opportunity of knowing one of their parents.386 Proponents of this 
restrictive view of PR rationalise their view on the basis of a maximalist view on 
the BIOC – as illustrated by the words of Landau: “If the child is important in 
and of itself, then one must consider the pain and suffering of an orphan who is 
conceived without ever knowing his or her father.”387  
The argument here is based on the assumption that not knowing one’s parents 
is harmful and will cause pain and suffering. It is also argued that children are 
psychologically harmed by knowing that they were conceived as orphans, and 
would not have any chance of knowing anything about one of their parents, 
except that they died before they were born.388 Arguments in this vein have 
been rightly criticised because while oft stated, little to no justification for these 
concerns are ever given.389 It is seemingly assumed that the harm suffered by 
children is self-evident. However, there is no evidence to support this.  
Furthermore, proponents of this view often fail to differentiate between 
knowing about a genetic parent – which refers to the children having access to 
information about their genetic parents – and knowing a genetic parent, which 
refers to having first-hand knowledge of one parent by personally meeting and 
having a relationship with a genetic parent. Posthumous children are, for 
obvious reasons, always denied the latter of these two experiences, but as 
shown in discussing objection 1, this does not necessarily lead to any 
psychological harm to the child. As to the former experience, while it is true 
that not knowing information about one’s genetic parent can lead to 
psychological difficulties for the child, it is not an essential nor common feature 
of PR to withhold knowledge regarding the child’s genetic origins from them. 
Research on knowing about one’s genetic parents and its impact on child 
welfare has established that the development of adopted children who know of 
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their genetic parents, when compared to those children who do not, benefitted 
by this knowledge.390 Where information about the identity of an adopted 
child's biological parents is withheld, it has been shown that this may lead to 
the child being confused about their identity, and at risk of developing 
emotional problems.391  
While there might be good reasons to withhold the identity of a genetic parent, 
in cases such as adoption or where donor gametes are used no similar 
reasons exist with PR. As such, in light of the importance of this information, 
and that there is ostensibly no reason to withhold it, posthumous children 
ought not to be deprived of knowledge about the deceased gamete provider. 
This would not be a challenge for PR in South Africa, because while the 
RRAFP do have provisions for protecting the identity of gamete donors, these 
do not prohibit surviving partners sharing information with the resultant child – 
regarding the spousal donor. In conclusion, there is no evidence for the claim 
that PR results in psychological harm to children, and thus this objection 
cannot serve as a basis to limit the right to reproduction.  
 
Objection 3: Inheritance and Survivor Benefits 
This objection is premised on the idea that the posthumous child being denied 
certain benefits that would otherwise accrue to the child were he or she not a 
posthumous child, is a harm to the posthumous child.392 This objection stems 
from the existence of rules stating that only living children may inherit from a 
deceased person’s estate, or those children born soon afterward (usually 
within 9 months of death). In South African law, the laws of testation presently 
exclude posthumous children from inheriting in this way.393  
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Because of this, it is argued that PR ought to be subject to conditions or there 
being some other legal mechanism that facilitates posthumous children 
benefitting to prevent this perceived harm. The argument in favour of 
posthumous children benefitting from the deceased estate, is based on 
equality. It is argued that posthumous children are entitled to equal protection 
before the law, which includes the right to be legally recognised as the child of 
the deceased and to inherit from their estate as other children born pursuant to 
means other than PR.394 There is, however, a good reason for why these 
rules exist, that also provides a reason why they should remain the same 
which was highlighted in the discussion of the UPA and the UPC in Chapter 2. 
This being that estates cannot be allowed to remain open indefinitely where 
the deceased had stored reproductive material, out of consideration for the 
posthumous child benefitting from it. The state has an interest in ensuring 
matters concerning deceased estates are settled without extensive delays – to 
ensure stable land titles and an orderly distribution of property after death.395 
It is uncontroversial to say that it is in the posthumous child’s best interests to 
benefit from the estate of a deceased parent. However, PR itself is not the 
reason why children are deprived of their opportunity to inherit. Rather, this 
evidently is a consequence of laws that have failed to develop and keep up 
with contemporary realities, and, as such, I submit that it makes little sense to 
limit procreative liberty because of archaic laws. Instead, measures need to be 
taken to compensate for these deficiencies in the law, until legislative reform 
takes place – as has happened in in certain US states. Where the law in US 
states has failed to address the legal position of posthumous children, some 
courts have opted to simply ignore the application of the relevant laws 
concerning inheritance in order to avoid potentially harsh consequence on 
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children.396 For our law to go the same way would be undesirable, and as 
such I submit the law ought to provide for these situations to avoid individuals 
having to have recourse to courts.  
One solution posited for how regulation of PR can ensure the timely disposition 
of estates, without prejudicing the posthumous child, is requiring a limited time 
period within which an action may be brought on the child’s behalf.397 This 
provides justification for the limitation of PR via a time restriction, as is seen in 
states such as Spain. This, however, should not be in terms that prohibit PR, 
unless it is done within a particular time period. In this case what is at stake is 
whether the posthumous child may collect a benefit, and in my view if the child 
is in some circumstances not permitted to claim this benefit because the 
surviving partner chose to delay exercising their right to PR, the child is not 
harmed in a legally significant way if he or she will still be born into a family 
where they will have their needs provided for. I reiterate, once again, that when 
considering the limitations of procreative liberty, the BIOC must not be 
interpreted as requiring that children must be born into the most advantageous 
circumstances possible – only that they are not born into circumstances where 
there is justifiable reason to believe that they will suffer material negative 
consequences as a result of the parent’s reproductive choices. There is no 
evidence to show that posthumous children not born within the prescribed time 
period, such that they would not inherit, would have any such negative 
outcome. 
As to survivor benefits, these are particularly an issue in countries like the US, 
where, because the mortality in the military is high, soldiers commonly store 
their reproductive material. 398 Survivor benefits refers to financial support 
given by the state to the surviving family of fallen soldiers, including their 
spouses and children. However, these benefits generally only accrue to 
children alive at the time of the soldier’s death. Because of this, authors such 
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as Tietelbaum argue that posthumous children should also be allowed to claim 
survivor benefits. 399  The issue of survivor benefits is comparatively less 
prevalent in the South African context; however, our state does provide for 
survivor benefits and these are indeed limited to the living children of the 
soldier at the time of their death.400 Seema notes that survivor benefits in 
South Africa exclude posthumous children, and is of the view that this is a 
violation of their right to equality, in that it is discrimination against posthumous 
children on the grounds of birth (a listed ground in section 9(3)), and that this is 
a discriminatory practice not dissimilar to the way our law used to discriminate 
against illegitimate children.401 I submit that the same policy referred to above 
as to estate benefits should apply to survivor benefits; there ought to be a 
limited time frame within which the posthumous children of fallen soldiers can 
claim benefits.  
In conclusion, the concerns raised in this objection relate to children being able 
to obtain an economic benefit. While there is evidence to support negative 
outcomes arising from economic disadvantage, as discussed on objection 1, it 
cannot be assumed that just because a child cannot claim an inheritance or 
survivor benefits, the surviving spouse cannot provide adequately for the child. 
It cannot be considered a justifiable interference with procreative liberty if a 
person making a request for PR should be barred from having that request 
fulfilled, when it best suits them just to make sure that posthumous children will 
inherit a benefit.  
 
 
 
                                                      
 
399 Teitelbaum op cit note 6 at 426. 
400 Government Employees Pension Fund ‘Death Benefits’ 
www.gepf.gov.za/index.php/our_benefits/article/death-benefits&hl=en-ZA (accessed 14 
November 2018). 
401 R Seema ‘Social Security Survivors’ Benefits in South Africa: Towards Legislative Reform 
Concerning Posthumously Conceived Children’ (2017) Obiter 96. 
102 
 
Objection 4: Surviving Spouse’s Psychological State 
This objection varies from the others, in that it is not focused solely on the 
harm to the posthumous child – but also considers harm to the surviving 
partner. The concern about the psychological state of the surviving partner 
underlies states such as Greece’s imposition of a specified waiting period after 
the death of the person whose reproductive material is to be used, before a 
request for PR may be fulfilled. The rationale behind this waiting period is that 
it supposedly allows surviving partners time to undergo psychological 
adjustment and to grieve the loss of their partner, in order to ensure that when 
making the decision to undergo PR – they do so on a rational basis.402 During 
this period, it is generally expected that the surviving partner will undergo 
some kind of counselling or psychological treatment before making his or her 
decision.  
The waiting period limitation has been criticised for being paternalistic, as it 
assumes that all surviving partners will grieve in the same way, and that at 
some point grief ends – at which point a person becomes better equipped to 
make important decisions.403 It also proves to be a barrier to people with 
medical issues relating to fertility, either because of illness or their age, such 
that a delay in beginning the MAR process would materially decrease their 
chances of a successful pregnancy.404 As alluded to earlier, this objection can 
also be conceived in a way that does not involve children, but focuses on the 
wellbeing of the partner themselves. In this way PR is seen as objectionable, 
because of the pressure it might impose on the surviving partner who may feel 
obligated to honour the deceased’s wishes.405 In responding to these issues 
on the psychological state of the surviving partner, the Ethics Committee of the 
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American Society for Reproductive Medicine, in their opinion on PR, suggest 
that surviving partners undergo mandatory counselling.406 
On this point, the actual views of surviving partners are instructive. In a study 
done on the perceptions of PR by women whose husbands had died while 
undergoing treatment for cancer, 52.5% of eligible women wished to keep the 
stored gametes of their husband, but subsequently over half never followed up 
with the PR.407 Bahadur attributes these results to the mandatory counselling 
undertaken by the widows. In four reported cases the mourning process, 
according to the widows, was aided by the knowledge that a part of the 
deceased still existed, and that the widow still had a chance to have a child 
with them.408 
Limitations on a surviving partner’s use of reproductive material, where that 
use has been consented to by the deceased, are potentially an unjust inroad 
into their autonomy. To prescribe waiting periods and counselling seems to be 
unwarranted. However, these options should certainly be made available to 
those making the decision to undergo MAR with the reproductive material of a 
deceased spouse. Surviving partners ought to be encouraged to undergo 
counselling, and they should be given the liberty to decide on their own with 
regard to how long to wait and when to undergo PR. 
It is practically impossible to measure the nature and impact of grief on one’s 
capacity to be a parent. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if a mandatory 
waiting period and counselling is justified. I submit, however, that in the 
absence of evidence that grief of the surviving partner does somehow impair 
the welfare of the posthumous child, we should respect his or her autonomy. It 
is important to keep in mind that experiencing the loss of a loved one does not 
in legal terms result in diminished legal capacity, and, as such, if the surviving 
partner believes he/she is ready and capable of undertaking the role of being a 
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parent to a deceased person’s child, we have no reason to doubt that – even if 
it is shortly after their partner’s death.  
Golombok argues that based on her study of relationships between mothers 
and children who conceived via MAR, the strong desire for parenthood results 
in these children having a stronger bond with their parents than children 
conceived via coital reproduction.409 What this indicates is that people who 
have a strong desire to become parents tend to be better parents, and, as 
such I suggest that it is in a child’s best interest that a surviving spouse’s 
request for PR be permitted – since not only do the surviving spouses possess 
a strong desire to be a parent, but they specifically have a strong desire to 
parent a child with a genetic link with their deceased partner, which will likely 
have a similarly positive impact on the relationship between the surviving 
partner and the posthumous child.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Human reproduction inherently is a matter relating to children, and, as such, 
procreative liberty often intersects with the state’s interests in protecting the 
child’s best interests. Where this happens, how far the state may go in limiting 
procreative liberty depends on how one applies the BIOC. In his analysis of the 
majority judgement of AB, Thaldar concludes:  
“When judges fail to uphold the rule of law, the ‘law’ becomes nothing more than 
the particular judges’ personal beliefs. What transpired in AB was not the rule of 
law but that of judges’ personal beliefs regarding the importance of blood-ties, 
with a transparent veneer of human-rights language”.410 
This comment outlines that the Constitutional Court’s judgement in AB serves 
as a perfect example of the kind of discrimination based on personal 
preferences that can happen when maximalist conceptions of the BIOC based 
on unsubstantiated assumptions, are allowed to triumph. Our state’s 
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commitment to the rule of law as a fundamental value in the Constitution 
demands an interpretation of the BIOC as only justifying the limitation of 
reproductive choices, where there is some rational basis for doing so. This 
does not, as the majority seemed to believe, place upon the state the burden 
to provide empirical evidence for every position in provision it creates. What 
this does mean, however, is that where provisions are tested for their 
constitutionality, clear evidence that the purported public good sought to be 
achieved by the state is without any evidentiary support, means that provision 
is irrational.  
Moving forward, South Africa in formulating its own position on PR must be 
mindful of avoiding arbitrary and capricious limitations of the right to reproduce 
posthumously. The many objections to PR are, for the most part, baseless and 
reflect stigmas against single parent households and orphans that should not 
be allowed to influence law. Golombok points out that MAR has long been the 
subject of irrationally extensive regulation, and observes that this is a product 
of its deviation from the ‘norm’ of the nuclear family, which is commonly 
regarded as highly valuable to society.411 Limitations of rights should not be 
based on popular norms but on evidence, and, in my view, the only evidence 
that could truly base a limitation of PR is the risk of the child being exposed to 
socio-economic challenges because the parent requesting PR is unable to 
support the child and provide them with an environment conducive to healthy 
development. As such PR, as with surrogacy, ought to be subject to the 
condition that the parent has the financial and other means needed to raise the 
posthumous child. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this study it has been highlighted that PR is a controversial issue that poses 
many challenging questions. As Bahadur remarks, “the issues raised by it are 
the most challenging, difficult and sensitive that are likely to be encountered in 
the field of medicine, let alone reproductive medicine”.412 Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the vast disparity in approaches on the regulation of PR – 
ranging from states such as France that have made laws specifically to outlaw 
the practice,413 to the United States that has limited itself to non-binding model 
laws to accommodate PR.414 The research has shown that states have chosen 
a variety of methods to deal with PR in all its forms, and many states have 
regarded the issues raised by PR as something that needs to be addressed in 
legislation. Where states have chosen not to take this course and have relied 
on voluntarily compliance, this results in instances where the courts and 
practitioners disregard state guidelines, and thus these guidelines fail to 
provide the clarity they were often endeavouring to achieve. I suggest that 
providing clarity on controversial issues is best achieved through legally binding 
legislation, which resolves the uncertainty that arises when there are gaps in 
the law, and avoids individual litigants having to approach the courts – 
sometimes at significant expense.  
In the Aevitas judgment, the High Court made its decision based on arguments 
relating to the common law principle of autonomy.415 There are, however, a 
number of constitutional rights at play when determining the legality of PR. 
Primarily there is section 12(2)(a), which protects an individual’s autonomy in 
making decisions concerning reproduction, and I have argued that it is not 
limited to only a person’s ability to make decisions concerning their own body, 
but also those reproductive decisions that would have an impact on their 
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psychological wellbeing. This is reinforced by the right to health care services in 
section 27(2), which I submit includes the right to access reproductive 
technologies necessary for MAR. Both these rights are an instance of 
procreative liberty, the proverbial bundle of rights underlying the exercising of 
reproductive rights including through MAR, and by extension PR.  
The application of the NHA and its regulations to PR is made unclear by the 
ambiguity in the provisions. It has been shown that a proper interpretation of the 
relevant sections and regulations require that ambiguous provisions be 
interpreted in a way that does infringe procreative liberty, if such an 
interpretation is reasonably tenable. In applying this interpretation to the 
impugned provisions, it has been shown that nothing in the extant law prohibits 
PR. Furthermore, an analysis of the application of procreative liberty to PR and 
the nature of reproductive material as property, reveals that there are several 
reasons based on human rights that it may be argued that one is entitled to 
engage in PR.  
Procreative liberty applies to all decisions concerning reproduction. However, 
what qualifies as a decision concerning reproduction has yet to receive much 
consideration in our law. I suggest, based on the broad scope of choices given 
to reproductive rights in international law, that procreative liberty in South Africa 
should be interpreted as including a right to make the choice to make 
reproductive material available for use after death. Procreative liberty also 
underscores the right of the surviving partner to make the choice to use the 
deceased’s reproductive material to have a child. South African law prescribes 
that reproductive material is capable of being owned, which leads to the 
conclusion that it is property, and, as such, it is submitted that the laws of 
testation can be applied to reproductive material – such that a person may 
transfer his or her rights in reproductive material to their partner after death 
through their will.  
The consequences of conceiving reproductive material as property to which the 
full extent of ownership rights applies unless specifically excluded, has a 
varying impact for the various forms of PR. In the case of PC, because the 
deceased is the owner of the reproductive material at death, he or she is 
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entitled to transfer control thereof to the surviving partner through a will or a 
written directive. With PEI, if the surviving partner is the woman who is the 
intended recipient, then she will have been the owner of the embryo, and, as 
such, there will be no legal obstacle to her using it. If, however, the surviving 
partner was not the intended recipient, she could obtain rights to the embryo 
through a will or written directive transferring ownership rights to her. This 
creates an apparent disparity on the basis of gender, since men can never be 
intended recipients and that could be challenged as unfair discrimination. The 
Infertility Awareness Association of South Africa (IFAASA) suggests preventing 
potential issues and conflicts arising regarding the ownership of embryos by 
having both gamete donors agree to co-ownership of the embryo, which can be 
canvassed in the consent to treatment form or a separate embryo disposition 
agreement.416 The benefit of such an approach to PR is that if either partner 
dies, sole ownership of the embryo will automatically vest in the surviving 
partner and he or shemay elect to use it or not. Alternatively, couples may 
choose to address PR directly in the terms of the embryo disposition agreement. 
Finally, in the case of PGR the use of gametes is permitted in the same was as 
with PC. However, here there is an added issue for consideration – that being 
the withdrawal of the reproductive material. I have suggested that the removal 
of gametes from a deceased person is not prohibited by the RRAFP, which only 
deals with the removal of tissue from living persons. 
The strength of the rights supporting PR are not to be limited arbitrarily. The use 
of MAR has long been subject to capricious circumspection, because of 
suspicions regarding the impact on children: 
“In spite of the changes that have taken place to the structure of the family in the 
latter part of this century, it remains the case that a family headed by two 
heterosexual married parents who are genetically related to their children 
represents the ideal, and that deviations from this pattern are commonly assumed 
to result in negative outcomes for the child.”417 [own underlining] 
                                                      
 
416  Martin op cit note 279. 
417 Golombok op cit note 378 at 2343. 
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PR poses some new and challenging questions that serve to test our country’s 
commitment to the constitutional values of freedom, equality, and respect for 
dignity.418 It has been shown that maximalist conceptions of protecting the 
child’s best interests that are based on personal beliefs or perceptions on what 
the majority view is, are an affront to South Africa’s hard-fought battle for liberty 
and individual autonomy. While there are many objections to PR, these have 
largely been shown to be the kind of baseless assumptions referred to by 
Golombok in the above quotation. In light of the absence of any definitive 
evidence of harm posed to resultant children, and the constitutionally protected 
right PR established above, PR must be permitted. 
In our law, the wishes of the deceased are honoured not because of 
posthumous rights held by the deceased, but because of the social value in 
treating the dead in a manner that is perceived to be respectful. In light of these 
conclusions, it is submitted that South Africa law on PR can best find 
expression in the Hybrid Approach to PR, in terms of which some affirmative 
proof or evidence of the deceased’s wish to procreate after death is required for 
PR to be allowed, in the form of the reasonably informed consent of the 
deceased. As such, consent by the deceased may be proven and need not be 
in writing; however, where a written record of the deceased’s wishes does exist, 
it ought to be honoured.419  
It is recommended that legislative reform should be undertaken to provide for 
PR. Such legislative reform should firstly provide for posthumous children by 
allowing these children to be legally recognised as the child of the deceased 
and allowing them to claim both estate and survivor benefits if they are 
conceived within a year of the deceased parent’s death. Legislative reform 
should also provide for the circumstances within which PR may be allowed. I 
suggest PR ought to be subject to an individual making a request to a court or a 
similar forum for authorisation to use a deceased person’s reproductive 
material, and whether such a request is granted should not be based on 
                                                      
 
418 Jordaan op cit note 282 at 18. 
419 Katz op cit note 11 at 304. 
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compliance with strict criteria, but rather the court should have the discretion to 
permit or deny requests based on a 3-stage enquiry:  
1. Does the requesting party have a claim to the reproductive material? 
2. Will granting the request be contrary to the deceased’s wishes? 
3. Will granting the request be in the prospective child’s best interests? 
The first stage of the enquiry serves to limit who may undergo PR, based on 
who has a right to use the reproductive material of the deceased. Only those 
persons who have a claim to ownership rights in relation to the reproductive 
material ought to be allowed to have such a request granted. Ownership rights 
in the reproductive material will arise automatically to spouses – in the case of 
gametes the surviving spouse will have a claim to the deceased’s sperm or 
eggs, by virtue of being the deceased’s heir in terms of intestate succession. A 
claim to ownership rights in gametes may also arise out of the deceased 
bequeathing to the requesting party in his or her will or indicating their desire to 
transfer the gametes into their care after death in a written directive (such as the 
consent form signed upon storing the gametes). In the case of embryos, as the 
joint property of the partners, the surviving partner will have an automatic claim 
to ownership. In the case of PGR, it is suggested that where there is prima facie 
proof of such a claim, this is a sufficient basis for removal from the deceased to 
be authorised on an urgent basis and for the gametes to be stored pending the 
outcome of a full application on whether or not the gametes may be used. 
The second stage of the enquiry serves to ensure that PR does not occur in a 
way that is contrary to the respectful treatment of the dead. The law protects the 
wishes of the deceased where they have been clearly expressed as such, and 
any clear indication that the deceased did not want to have his or her 
reproductive material used for PR will defeat any rights the requesting party 
may have to use the reproductive material. This is a non-issue if deceased 
persons made their desire to reproduce posthumously clear – in such a case 
there can be no basis for state interference with this desire. Where the 
deceased’s wishes have not been made clear, however, evidence may be 
brought by the requesting party to show that the deceased would not have 
opposed PR. It is important to recall that respect for the deceased’s wishes in 
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South Africa is not based on respect for the deceased’s’ autonomy (as they no 
longer have any autonomy rights), but rather on the social value in not treating 
the deceased’s remains in a disrespectful manner, and, as such, the test here 
is not ‘what would the deceased have wanted?’, but rather ‘is it appropriate in 
the circumstance to allow the request?’ – and the answer to this question will be 
‘no’ for the purposes of this enquiry, only if it would contrary to the deceased’s 
wishes.  
The final step of the enquiry is ascertaining whether the requesting party is 
competent and capable of providing for the posthumous child, in that he or she 
can provide the child with a healthy upbringing – even if this will not be in ideal 
circumstances. If the court, having undergone this enquiry, is of the view that 
the request ought to be granted, then the requesting party may exercise this 
choice immediately or choose to wait. Ultimately, PR is the choice of the people 
who will raise the posthumous children, and they ought to have the freedom to 
make the final decision on when they want to become a parent without state 
interference. This is at the very heart of procreative liberty. 
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